37 ideas
20962 | Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie] |
15670 | The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
15665 | We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
20573 | Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala] |
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
10859 | A set is 'well-ordered' if every subset has a first element [Clegg] |
10857 | Set theory made a closer study of infinity possible [Clegg] |
10864 | Any set can always generate a larger set - its powerset, of subsets [Clegg] |
10872 | Extensionality: Two sets are equal if and only if they have the same elements [Clegg] |
10875 | Pairing: For any two sets there exists a set to which they both belong [Clegg] |
10876 | Unions: There is a set of all the elements which belong to at least one set in a collection [Clegg] |
10878 | Infinity: There exists a set of the empty set and the successor of each element [Clegg] |
10877 | Powers: All the subsets of a given set form their own new powerset [Clegg] |
10879 | Choice: For every set a mechanism will choose one member of any non-empty subset [Clegg] |
10871 | Axiom of Existence: there exists at least one set [Clegg] |
10874 | Specification: a condition applied to a set will always produce a new set [Clegg] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
10880 | Mathematics can be 'pure' (unapplied), 'real' (physically grounded); or 'applied' (just applicable) [Clegg] |
10861 | Beyond infinity cardinals and ordinals can come apart [Clegg] |
10860 | An ordinal number is defined by the set that comes before it [Clegg] |
10854 | Transcendental numbers can't be fitted to finite equations [Clegg] |
10858 | By adding an axis of imaginary numbers, we get the useful 'number plane' instead of number line [Clegg] |
10853 | Either lack of zero made early mathematics geometrical, or the geometrical approach made zero meaningless [Clegg] |
10866 | Cantor's account of infinities has the shaky foundation of irrational numbers [Clegg] |
10869 | The Continuum Hypothesis is independent of the axioms of set theory [Clegg] |
10862 | The 'continuum hypothesis' says aleph-one is the cardinality of the reals [Clegg] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
20961 | What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie] |
15667 | To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas] |
15668 | Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
15669 | People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson] |
23416 | Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka] |