Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Theory of Communicative Action', 'Proper Names' and 'Axiomatic Theories of Truth (2005 ver)'

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24 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 5. Aims of Philosophy / a. Philosophy as worldly
20962 Habermas seems to make philosophy more democratic [Habermas, by Bowie]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
15670 The aim of 'post-metaphysical' philosophy is to interpret the sciences [Habermas, by Finlayson]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 5. Critical Theory
15665 We can do social philosophy by studying coordinated action through language use [Habermas, by Finlayson]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 4. Aims of Reason
20573 Rather than instrumental reason, Habermas emphasises its communicative role [Habermas, by Oksala]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 2. Defining Truth
15647 Truth definitions don't produce a good theory, because they go beyond your current language [Halbach]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / c. Meta-language for truth
15649 In semantic theories of truth, the predicate is in an object-language, and the definition in a metalanguage [Halbach]
3. Truth / G. Axiomatic Truth / 1. Axiomatic Truth
15655 Should axiomatic truth be 'conservative' - not proving anything apart from implications of the axioms? [Halbach]
15654 If truth is defined it can be eliminated, whereas axiomatic truth has various commitments [Halbach]
15650 Axiomatic theories of truth need a weak logical framework, and not a strong metatheory [Halbach]
15648 Instead of a truth definition, add a primitive truth predicate, and axioms for how it works [Halbach]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
15656 Deflationists say truth merely serves to express infinite conjunctions [Halbach]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
15657 To prove the consistency of set theory, we must go beyond set theory [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
15652 We can use truth instead of ontologically loaded second-order comprehension assumptions about properties [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 7. Predicates in Logic
15651 Instead of saying x has a property, we can say a formula is true of x - as long as we have 'true' [Halbach]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
7746 We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle]
7747 How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle]
7748 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle]
7749 Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle]
7750 Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
20961 What is considered a priori changes as language changes [Habermas, by Bowie]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 1. Meaning
15667 To understand a statement is to know what would make it acceptable [Habermas]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention
15668 Meaning is not fixed by a relation to the external world, but a relation to other speakers [Habermas, by Finlayson]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
15669 People endorse equality, universality and inclusiveness, just by their communicative practices [Habermas, by Finlayson]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
23416 Political involvement is needed, to challenge existing practices [Habermas, by Kymlicka]