Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosopher's Toolkit', 'Counterpart theory and Quant. Modal Logic' and 'Science of Logic'

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52 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
If we start with indeterminate being, we arrive at being and nothing as a united pair [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Thought about being leads to a string of other concepts, like becoming, quantity, specificity, causality... [Hegel, by Houlgate]
We must start with absolute abstraction, with no presuppositions, so we start with pure being [Hegel]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 5. Objectivity
Objectivity is not by correspondence, but by the historical determined necessity of Geist [Hegel, by Pinkard]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
Being and nothing are the same and not the same, which is the identity of identity and non-identity [Hegel]
The so-called world is filled with contradiction [Hegel]
You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl]
Dialectic is the instability of thoughts generating their opposite, and then new more complex thoughts [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Hegel's dialectic is not thesis-antithesis-synthesis, but usually negation of negation of the negation [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl]
In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / d. Non-being
To grasp an existence, we must consider its non-existence [Hegel, by Houlgate]
Nothing exists, as thinkable and expressible [Hegel]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
Thinking of nothing is not the same as simply not thinking [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
The ground of a thing is not another thing, but the first thing's substance or rational concept [Hegel, by Houlgate]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Kant's thing-in-itself is just an abstraction from our knowledge; things only exist for us [Hegel, by Bowie]
Hegel believe that the genuine categories reveal things in themselves [Hegel, by Houlgate]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 2. Internal Relations
The nature of each category relates itself to another [Hegel]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Aristotelian essentialism says essences are not relative to specification [Lewis]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Causal necessities hold in all worlds compatible with the laws of nature [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
It doesn't take the whole of a possible Humphrey to win the election [Lewis]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Counterpart theory is bizarre, as no one cares what happens to a mere counterpart [Kripke on Lewis]
Counterparts are not the original thing, but resemble it more than other things do [Lewis]
If the closest resembler to you is in fact quite unlike you, then you have no counterpart [Lewis]
Essential attributes are those shared with all the counterparts [Lewis]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
In absolute knowing, the gap between object and oneself closes, producing certainty [Hegel]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
The 'absolute idea' is when all the contradictions are exhausted [Hegel, by Bowie]
Hegel, unlike Kant, said how things appear is the same as how things are [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
Hegel's non-subjective idealism is the unity of subjective and objective viewpoints [Hegel, by Pinkard]
Hegel claimed his system was about the world, but it only mapped conceptual interdependence [Pinkard on Hegel]
Authentic thinking and reality have the same content [Hegel]
The Absolute is the primitive system of concepts which are actualised [Hegel, by Gardner]
The absolute idea is being, imperishable life, self-knowing truth, and all truth [Hegel]
The absolute idea is the great unity of the infinite system of concepts [Hegel, by Moore,AW]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Hegel's 'absolute idea' is the interdependence of all truths to justify any of them [Hegel, by Bowie]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl]
To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Every concept depends on the counter-concepts of what it is not [Hegel, by Bowie]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 4. Analytic/Synthetic Critique
When we explicate the category of being, we watch a new category emerge [Hegel, by Houlgate]