Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Philosopher's Toolkit', 'Senses of Essence' and 'A Philosophy of Boredom'

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36 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
Modern Western culture suddenly appeared in Jena in the 1790s [Svendsen]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
You can't understand love in terms of 'if and only if...' [Svendsen]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
The Principle of Sufficient Reason does not presuppose that all explanations will be causal explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
You cannot rationally deny the principle of non-contradiction, because all reasoning requires it [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / C. Styles of Reason / 1. Dialectic
Dialectic aims at unified truth, unlike analysis, which divides into parts [Baggini /Fosl]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
The essence or definition of an essence involves either a class of properties or a class of propositions [Fine,K]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
'Natural' systems of deduction are based on normal rational practice, rather than on axioms [Baggini /Fosl]
In ideal circumstances, an axiom should be such that no rational agent could possibly object to its use [Baggini /Fosl]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
The principle of bivalence distorts reality, as when claiming that a person is or is not 'thin' [Baggini /Fosl]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Logical concepts rest on certain inferences, not on facts about implications [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 3. Property (λ-) Abstraction
The property of Property Abstraction says any suitable condition must imply a property [Fine,K]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A logical truth is true in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
Can the essence of an object circularly involve itself, or involve another object? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
Being a man is a consequence of his essence, not constitutive of it [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
If there are alternative definitions, then we have three possibilities for essence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
If identity is based on 'true of X' instead of 'property of X' we get the Masked Man fallacy ('I know X but not Y') [Baggini /Fosl, by PG]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
'I have the same car as you' is fine; 'I have the same fiancée as you' is not so good [Baggini /Fosl]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Leibniz's Law is about the properties of objects; the Identity of Indiscernibles is about perception of objects [Baggini /Fosl]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Is 'events have causes' analytic a priori, synthetic a posteriori, or synthetic a priori? [Baggini /Fosl]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
'A priori' does not concern how you learn a proposition, but how you show whether it is true or false [Baggini /Fosl]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
If subjective and objective begin to merge, then so do primary and secondary qualities [Svendsen]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
Basic beliefs are self-evident, or sensual, or intuitive, or revealed, or guaranteed [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
A proposition such as 'some swans are purple' cannot be falsified, only verified [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 1. Induction
The problem of induction is how to justify our belief in the uniformity of nature [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
How can an argument be good induction, but poor deduction? [Baggini /Fosl]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / a. Best explanation
Abduction aims at simplicity, testability, coherence and comprehensiveness [Baggini /Fosl]
To see if an explanation is the best, it is necessary to investigate the alternative explanations [Baggini /Fosl]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / b. Types of emotion
Emotions have intentional objects, while a mood is objectless [Svendsen]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Consistency is the cornerstone of rationality [Baggini /Fosl]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
Death appears to be more frightening the less one has lived [Svendsen]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 4. Boredom
The profoundest boredom is boredom with boredom [Svendsen]
We are bored because everything comes to us fully encoded, and we want personal meaning [Svendsen]
Boredom is so radical that suicide could not overcome it; only never having existed would do it [Svendsen]
We can be unaware that we are bored [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
We have achieved a sort of utopia, and it is boring, so that is the end of utopias [Svendsen]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 9. Communism
The concept of 'alienation' seems no longer applicable [Svendsen]