88 ideas
14912 | There is no test for metaphysics, except devising alternative theories [Ladyman/Ross] |
14904 | Metaphysics builds consilience networks across science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14907 | Progress in metaphysics must be tied to progress in science [Ladyman/Ross] |
14908 | Metaphysics must involve at least two scientific hypotheses, one fundamental, and add to explanation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14910 | Some science is so general that it is metaphysical [Ladyman/Ross] |
14940 | Cutting-edge physics has little to offer metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14945 | The aim of metaphysics is to unite the special sciences with physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14898 | Modern metaphysics pursues aesthetic criteria like story-writing, and abandons scientific truth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14899 | Why think that conceptual analysis reveals reality, rather than just how people think? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14936 | A metaphysics based on quantum gravity could result in almost anything [Ladyman/Ross] |
14905 | The supremacy of science rests on its iterated error filters [Ladyman/Ross] |
14897 | We should abandon intuitions, especially that the world is made of little things, and made of something [Ladyman/Ross] |
9847 | A contextual definition permits the elimination of the expression by a substitution [Dummett] |
9820 | In classical logic, logical truths are valid formulas; in higher-order logics they are purely logical [Dummett] |
14943 | Maybe mathematical logic rests on information-processing [Ladyman/Ross] |
9896 | A prime number is one which is measured by a unit alone [Dummett] |
18255 | Addition of quantities is prior to ordering, as shown in cyclic domains like angles [Dummett] |
9895 | A number is a multitude composed of units [Dummett] |
9852 | We understand 'there are as many nuts as apples' as easily by pairing them as by counting them [Dummett] |
9829 | The identity of a number may be fixed by something outside structure - by counting [Dummett] |
9828 | Numbers aren't fixed by position in a structure; it won't tell you whether to start with 0 or 1 [Dummett] |
9876 | Set theory isn't part of logic, and why reduce to something more complex? [Dummett] |
14948 | To be is to be a real pattern [Ladyman/Ross] |
14942 | Only admit into ontology what is explanatory and predictive [Ladyman/Ross] |
14947 | Any process can be described as transfer of measurable information [Ladyman/Ross] |
14941 | We say there is no fundamental level to ontology, and reality is just patterns [Ladyman/Ross] |
9884 | The distinction of concrete/abstract, or actual/non-actual, is a scale, not a dichotomy [Dummett] |
10493 | If concrete is spatio-temporal and causal, and abstract isn't, the distinction doesn't suit physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14934 | Concrete and abstract are too crude for modern physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
9869 | Realism is just the application of two-valued semantics to sentences [Dummett] |
14909 | Physicalism is 'part-whole' (all parts are physical), or 'supervenience/levels' (dependence on physical) [Ladyman/Ross] |
14926 | Relations without relata must be treated as universals, with their own formal properties [Ladyman/Ross] |
14929 | A belief in relations must be a belief in things that are related [Ladyman/Ross] |
14925 | The normal assumption is that relations depend on properties of the relata [Ladyman/Ross] |
14931 | That there are existent structures not made of entities is no stranger than the theory of universals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14932 | Causal essentialism says properties are nothing but causal relations [Ladyman/Ross] |
14920 | If science captures the modal structure of things, that explains why its predictions work [Ladyman/Ross] |
9880 | Nominalism assumes unmediated mental contact with objects [Dummett] |
14952 | Things are constructs for tracking patterns (and not linguistic, because animals do it) [Ladyman/Ross] |
9885 | The existence of abstract objects is a pseudo-problem [Dummett] |
9858 | Abstract objects nowadays are those which are objective but not actual [Dummett] |
9859 | It is absurd to deny the Equator, on the grounds that it lacks causal powers [Dummett] |
9860 | 'We've crossed the Equator' has truth-conditions, so accept the Equator - and it's an object [Dummett] |
9872 | Abstract objects need the context principle, since they can't be encountered directly [Dummett] |
14950 | Maybe individuation can be explained by thermodynamic depth [Ladyman/Ross] |
14927 | Physics seems to imply that we must give up self-subsistent individuals [Ladyman/Ross] |
14944 | There is no single view of individuals, because different sciences operate on different scales [Ladyman/Ross] |
14946 | There are no cats in quantum theory, and no mountains in astrophysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14928 | Things are abstractions from structures [Ladyman/Ross] |
14892 | The idea of composition, that parts of the world are 'made of' something, is no longer helpful [Ladyman/Ross] |
14949 | A sum of things is not a whole if the whole does not support some new generalisation [Ladyman/Ross] |
14951 | We treat the core of a pattern as an essence, in order to keep track of it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14958 | A continuous object might be a type, with instances at each time [Ladyman/Ross] |
9848 | Content is replaceable if identical, so replaceability can't define identity [Dummett, by Dummett] |
9842 | Frege introduced criteria for identity, but thought defining identity was circular [Dummett] |
14903 | Quantum mechanics seems to imply single-case probabilities [Ladyman/Ross] |
14923 | In quantum statistics, two separate classical states of affairs are treated as one [Ladyman/Ross] |
14955 | Rats find some obvious associations easier to learn than less obvious ones [Ladyman/Ross] |
14918 | The doctrine of empiricism does not itself seem to be empirically justified [Ladyman/Ross] |
14891 | There is no reason to think our intuitions are good for science or metaphysics [Ladyman/Ross] |
20921 | How can we state relativism of sweet and sour, if they have no determinate nature? [Theophrastus] |
14916 | What matters is whether a theory can predict - not whether it actually does so [Ladyman/Ross] |
14915 | The theory of evolution was accepted because it explained, not because of its predictions [Ladyman/Ross] |
14922 | The Ramsey sentence describes theoretical entities; it skips reference, but doesn't eliminate it [Ladyman/Ross] |
14921 | The Ramsey-sentence approach preserves observations, but eliminates unobservables [Ladyman/Ross] |
14953 | Induction is reasoning from the observed to the unobserved [Ladyman/Ross] |
14914 | Inductive defences of induction may be rule-circular, but not viciously premise-circular [Ladyman/Ross] |
14913 | We explain by deriving the properties of a phenomenon by embedding it in a large abstract theory [Ladyman/Ross] |
14930 | Maybe the only way we can think about a domain is by dividing it up into objects [Ladyman/Ross] |
14939 | Two versions of quantum theory say that the world is deterministic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14911 | Science is opposed to downward causation [Ladyman/Ross] |
9849 | Maybe a concept is 'prior' to another if it can be defined without the second concept [Dummett] |
9850 | An argument for conceptual priority is greater simplicity in explanation [Dummett] |
9873 | Abstract terms are acceptable as long as we know how they function linguistically [Dummett] |
9993 | There is no reason why abstraction by equivalence classes should be called 'logical' [Dummett, by Tait] |
9857 | We arrive at the concept 'suicide' by comparing 'Cato killed Cato' with 'Brutus killed Brutus' [Dummett] |
9833 | To abstract from spoons (to get the same number as the forks), the spoons must be indistinguishable too [Dummett] |
9836 | Fregean semantics assumes a domain articulated into individual objects [Dummett] |
14956 | Explanation by kinds and by clusters of properties just express the stability of reality [Ladyman/Ross] |
14957 | There is nothing more to a natural kind than a real pattern in nature [Ladyman/Ross] |
14954 | Causation is found in the special sciences, but may have no role in fundamental physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14902 | Science may have uninstantiated laws, inferred from approaching some unrealised limit [Ladyman/Ross] |
14937 | That the universe must be 'made of' something is just obsolete physics [Ladyman/Ross] |
14900 | In physics, matter is an emergent phenomenon, not part of fundamental ontology [Ladyman/Ross] |
18257 | Why should the limit of measurement be points, not intervals? [Dummett] |
14901 | Spacetime may well be emergent, rather than basic [Ladyman/Ross] |
14924 | If spacetime is substantial, what is the substance? [Ladyman/Ross] |
14938 | A fixed foliation theory of quantum gravity could make presentism possible [Ladyman/Ross] |