52 ideas
| 13734 | Modern Quinean metaphysics is about what exists, but Aristotelian metaphysics asks about grounding [Schaffer,J] |
| 13751 | If you tore the metaphysics out of philosophy, the whole enterprise would collapse [Schaffer,J] |
| 13743 | We should not multiply basic entities, but we can have as many derivative entities as we like [Schaffer,J] |
| 13741 | If 'there are red roses' implies 'there are roses', then 'there are prime numbers' implies 'there are numbers' [Schaffer,J] |
| 13748 | Grounding is unanalysable and primitive, and is the basic structuring concept in metaphysics [Schaffer,J] |
| 13747 | Supervenience is just modal correlation [Schaffer,J] |
| 13744 | The cosmos is the only fundamental entity, from which all else exists by abstraction [Schaffer,J] |
| 13739 | Maybe categories are just the different ways that things depend on basic substances [Schaffer,J] |
| 13742 | There exist heaps with no integral unity, so we should accept arbitrary composites in the same way [Schaffer,J] |
| 13752 | The notion of 'grounding' can explain integrated wholes in a way that mere aggregates can't [Schaffer,J] |
| 13749 | Belief in impossible worlds may require dialetheism [Schaffer,J] |
| 6346 | The main epistemological theories are foundationalist, coherence, probabilistic and reliabilist [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6351 | Most people now agree that our reasoning proceeds defeasibly, rather than deductively [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6374 | To believe maximum truths, believe everything; to have infallible beliefs, believe nothing [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 13740 | 'Moorean certainties' are more credible than any sceptical argument [Schaffer,J] |
| 6355 | Direct realism says justification is partly a function of pure perceptual states, not of beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6359 | Phenomenalism offered conclusive perceptual knowledge, but conclusive reasons no longer seem essential [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6366 | Perception causes beliefs in us, without inference or justification [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6362 | Sense evidence is not beliefs, because they are about objective properties, not about appearances [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6371 | Bayesian epistemology is Bayes' Theorem plus the 'simple rule' (believe P if it is probable) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6373 | Internalism says if anything external varies, the justifiability of the belief does not vary [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6353 | People rarely have any basic beliefs, and never enough for good foundations [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6361 | Foundationalism requires self-justification, not incorrigibility [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6357 | Reason cannot be an ultimate foundation, because rational justification requires prior beliefs [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6363 | Foundationalism is wrong, because either all beliefs are prima facie justified, or none are [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6365 | Negative coherence theories do not require reasons, so have no regress problem [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6354 | Coherence theories fail, because they can't accommodate perception as the basis of knowledge [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6367 | Coherence theories isolate justification from the world [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6370 | Externalism comes as 'probabilism' (probability of truth) and 'reliabilism' (probability of good cognitive process) [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6358 | One belief may cause another, without being the basis for the second belief [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6364 | We can't start our beliefs from scratch, because we wouldn't know where to start [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6352 | Enumerative induction gives a universal judgement, while statistical induction gives a proportion [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6372 | Since every tautology has a probability of 1, should we believe all tautologies? [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 6360 | Scientific confirmation is best viewed as inference to the best explanation [Pollock/Cruz] |
| 23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
| 23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
| 23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
| 23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
| 23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
| 23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
| 23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
| 23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
| 23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
| 23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
| 23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
| 23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
| 23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
| 23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
| 23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
| 23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
| 23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
| 23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |