Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Semantic Tradition from Kant to Carnap', 'Four Decades of Scientific Explanation' and 'Letter to Shumacher'

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26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
18270 Choice suggests that intensions are not needed to ensure classes [Coffa]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 5. The Infinite / d. Actual infinite
10855 Actual infinities are not allowed in mathematics - only limits which may increase without bound [Gauss]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
13047 It is knowing 'why' that gives scientific understanding, not knowing 'that' [Salmon]
13065 Understanding is an extremely vague concept [Salmon]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
18263 The semantic tradition aimed to explain the a priori semantically, not by Kantian intuition [Coffa]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
18272 Platonism defines the a priori in a way that makes it unknowable [Coffa]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 4. Prediction
13054 Correlations can provide predictions, but only causes can give explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 3. Instrumentalism
13067 For the instrumentalists there are no scientific explanations [Salmon]
14. Science / C. Induction / 4. Reason in Induction
13055 Good induction needs 'total evidence' - the absence at the time of any undermining evidence [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / b. Aims of explanation
13046 Scientific explanation is not reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar [Salmon]
13058 Why-questions can seek evidence as well as explanation [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
13064 The three basic conceptions of scientific explanation are modal, epistemic, and ontic [Salmon]
13050 The 'inferential' conception is that all scientific explanations are arguments [Salmon]
13059 Ontic explanations can be facts, or reports of facts [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / e. Lawlike explanations
13049 We must distinguish true laws because they (unlike accidental generalizations) explain things [Salmon]
13051 Deductive-nomological explanations will predict, and their predictions will explain [Salmon]
13053 A law is not enough for explanation - we need information about what makes a difference [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13061 Flagpoles explain shadows, and not vice versa, because of temporal ordering [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
13045 Explanation at the quantum level will probably be by entirely new mechanisms [Salmon]
13062 Does an item have a function the first time it occurs? [Salmon]
13063 Explanations reveal the mechanisms which produce the facts [Salmon]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / l. Probabilistic explanations
13060 Can events whose probabilities are low be explained? [Salmon]
13056 Statistical explanation needs relevance, not high probability [Salmon]
13057 Think of probabilities in terms of propensities rather than frequencies [Salmon]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 5. Generalisation by mind
18266 Mathematics generalises by using variables [Coffa]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
18279 Relativity is as absolutist about space-time as Newton was about space [Coffa]