14 ideas
| 6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
| 14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
| 15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
| 6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
| 15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |
| 21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |