11 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
19565 | How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt] |
19564 | Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |