19 ideas
22138 | Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter] |
15567 | Some events involve no change; they must, because causal histories involve unchanges [Lewis] |
15561 | The events that suit semantics may not be the events that suit causation [Lewis] |
15565 | Events have inbuilt essences, as necessary conditions for their occurrence [Lewis] |
15566 | Events are classes, and so there is a mereology of their parts [Lewis] |
15564 | An event is a property of a unique space-time region [Lewis] |
15563 | Properties are very abundant (unlike universals), and are used for semantics and higher-order variables [Lewis] |
15797 | All structures are dispositional, objects are dispositions sets, and events manifest dispositions [Fetzer] |
22134 | Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter] |
15800 | All events and objects are dispositional, and hence all structural properties are dispositional [Fetzer] |
22150 | Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter] |
22139 | Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter] |
22136 | Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter] |
22135 | Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter] |
22152 | Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter] |
22156 | The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter] |
15798 | Kinds are arrangements of dispositions [Fetzer] |
15562 | Causation is a general relation derived from instances of causal dependence [Lewis] |
15799 | Lawlike sentences are general attributions of disposition to all members of some class [Fetzer] |