Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Tenseless Theory of Time', 'Philosophical Studies 1611-19' and 'Value Theory'

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20 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
14611 Metaphysics should avoid talk of past, present or future [Smart]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 2. Hylomorphism / c. Form as causal
16625 In hylomorphism all the explanation of actions is in the form, and the matter doesn't do anything [Bacon]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
16624 Stripped and passive matter is just a human invention [Bacon]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
14613 Special relativity won't determine a preferred frame, but we can pick one externally [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
14615 If time flows, then 'how fast does it flow?' is a tricky question [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
14614 The past, present, future and tenses of A-theory are too weird, and should be analysed indexically [Smart]