27 ideas
| 14611 | Metaphysics should avoid talk of past, present or future [Smart] |
| 8820 | Rules of reasoning precede the concept of truth, and they are what characterize it [Pollock] |
| 8819 | We need the concept of truth for defeasible reasoning [Pollock] |
| 17453 | The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck] |
| 17457 | A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck] |
| 17448 | In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck] |
| 17455 | Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck] |
| 17456 | Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck] |
| 17450 | Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck] |
| 17451 | We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck] |
| 17459 | Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck] |
| 17454 | Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck] |
| 17458 | Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck] |
| 17449 | We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck] |
| 8822 | Statements about necessities need not be necessarily true [Pollock] |
| 8818 | Defeasible reasoning requires us to be able to think about our thoughts [Pollock] |
| 8811 | What we want to know is - when is it all right to believe something? [Pollock] |
| 8817 | Logical entailments are not always reasons for beliefs, because they may be irrelevant [Pollock] |
| 8814 | Epistemic norms are internalised procedural rules for reasoning [Pollock] |
| 8823 | Reasons are always for beliefs, but a perceptual state is a reason without itself being a belief [Pollock] |
| 8813 | If we have to appeal explicitly to epistemic norms, that will produce an infinite regress [Pollock] |
| 8812 | Norm Externalism says norms must be internal, but their selection is partly external [Pollock] |
| 8816 | Externalists tend to take a third-person point of view of epistemology [Pollock] |
| 8815 | Belief externalism is false, because external considerations cannot be internalized for actual use [Pollock] |
| 14613 | Special relativity won't determine a preferred frame, but we can pick one externally [Smart] |
| 14615 | If time flows, then 'how fast does it flow?' is a tricky question [Smart] |
| 14614 | The past, present, future and tenses of A-theory are too weird, and should be analysed indexically [Smart] |