19 ideas
24232 | Truth is speaking what is and things that are [Plato] |
24233 | If speech is making something, then lies are impossible [Plato] |
10835 | True sentences says the appropriate descriptive thing on the appropriate demonstrative occasion [Austin,JL] |
10836 | Correspondence theorists shouldn't think that a country has just one accurate map [Austin,JL] |
304 | Beautiful things must be different from beauty itself, but beauty itself must be present in each of them [Plato] |
11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
16120 | Knowing how to achieve immortality is pointless without the knowledge how to use immortality [Plato] |
303 | Say how many teeth the other has, then count them. If you are right, we will trust your other claims [Plato] |
302 | What knowledge is required to live well? [Plato] |
301 | Only knowledge of some sort is good [Plato] |
305 | Something which lies midway between two evils is better than either of them [Plato] |
11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |