Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong', 'World and Essence' and 'Aristotle on Matter'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

18 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
12302 Definitions formed an abstract hierarchy for Aristotle, as sets do for us [Fine,K]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 5. Genus and Differentia
14266 Aristotle sees hierarchies in definitions using genus and differentia (as we see them in sets) [Fine,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
14268 Maybe bottom-up grounding shows constitution, and top-down grounding shows essence [Fine,K]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
16435 Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
14655 The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
14658 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
14267 There is no distinctive idea of constitution, because you can't say constitution begins and ends [Fine,K]
14264 Is there a plausible Aristotelian notion of constitution, applicable to both physical and non-physical? [Fine,K]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
14656 Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 9. Essence and Properties
14654 Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga]
14653 X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga]
14660 If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga]
14661 Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
14657 Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
14652 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
14659 We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
4761 The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 6. Early Matter Theories / a. Greek matter
14265 The components of abstract definitions could play the same role as matter for physical objects [Fine,K]