Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong', 'Structuralism' and 'The Nature of Rationality'

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9 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
I do not care if my trivial beliefs are false, and I have no interest in many truths [Nozick]
3. Truth / E. Pragmatic Truth / 1. Pragmatic Truth
Maybe James was depicting the value of truth, and not its nature [Nozick]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / a. Structuralism
Structuralism is now common, studying relations, with no regard for what the objects might be [Hellman]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
Maybe mathematical objects only have structural roles, and no intrinsic nature [Hellman]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 5. Rationality / a. Rationality
Rationality is normally said to concern either giving reasons, or reliability [Nozick]
In the instrumental view of rationality it only concerns means, and not ends [Nozick]
Is it rational to believe a truth which leads to permanent misery? [Nozick]
Rationality needs some self-consciousness, to also evaluate how we acquired our reasons [Nozick]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]