Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong', 'Metaphysics: contemporary introduction' and 'Locke on Human Understanding'

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14 ideas

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
4483 If abstract terms are sets of tropes, 'being a unicorn' and 'being a griffin' turn out identical [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
4481 Austere nominalists insist that the realist's universals lack the requisite independent identifiability [Loux]
4477 Universals come in hierarchies of generality [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
4482 Austere nominalism has to take a host of things (like being red, or human) as primitive [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / c. Nominalism about abstracta
4478 Nominalism needs to account for abstract singular terms like 'circularity'. [Loux]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism
7720 Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / c. Individuation by location
4480 Times and places are identified by objects, so cannot be used in a theory of object-identity [Loux]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / d. Substance defined
7712 On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7710 Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
7711 Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
7714 Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
7715 Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
7722 If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
4761 The 'error theory' of morals says there is no moral knowledge, because there are no moral facts [Mackie, by Engel]