Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Existence', 'Perception' and 'Truly Understood'

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24 ideas

7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15200 How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
14761 Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 6. Knowing How
7630 Ryle's dichotomy between knowing how and knowing that is too simplistic [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
7632 Perception is sensation-then-concept, or direct-concepts, or sensation-saturated-in-concepts [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
7635 Sense-data have an epistemological purpose (foundations) and a metaphysical purpose (explanation) [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7638 One thesis says we are not aware of qualia, but only of objects and their qualities [Maund]
7642 The Myth of the Given claims that thought is rationally supported by non-conceptual experiences [Maund]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 8. Adverbial Theory
7640 Mountains are adverbial modifications of the earth, but still have object-characteristics [Maund]
7641 Adverbialism tries to avoid sense-data and preserve direct realism [Maund]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
12608 Concepts are distinguished by roles in judgement, and are thus tied to rationality [Peacocke]
18. Thought / C. Content / 1. Content
7637 Thought content is either satisfaction conditions, or exercise of concepts [Maund, by PG]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 3. Ontology of Concepts / c. Fregean concepts
12605 A sense is individuated by the conditions for reference [Peacocke]
12607 Fregean concepts have their essence fixed by reference-conditions [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / a. Conceptual structure
12609 Concepts have distinctive reasons and norms [Peacocke]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / b. Analysis of concepts
12604 Any explanation of a concept must involve reference and truth [Peacocke]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 4. Compositionality
12610 Encountering novel sentences shows conclusively that meaning must be compositional [Peacocke]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
2608 For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
22936 A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
4231 Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
8591 There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
22935 The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
7802 A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
4230 A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
15199 The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]