Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'The Nature of Existence', 'Events' and 'Deflating Existential Consequence'

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23 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
12442 'Mickey Mouse is a fictional mouse' is true without a truthmaker [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 1. Redundant Truth
12439 Truth is dispensable, by replacing truth claims with the sentence itself [Azzouni]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 2. Deflationary Truth
12437 Truth lets us assent to sentences we can't explicitly exhibit [Azzouni]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
12446 Names function the same way, even if there is no object [Azzouni]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
12447 That all existents have causal powers is unknowable; the claim is simply an epistemic one [Azzouni]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15200 How could change consist of a conjunction of changeless facts? [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
14761 Change is not just having two different qualities at different points in some series [McTaggart]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
9413 An event is a change in or to an object [Lombard, by Mumford]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 7. Fictionalism
12445 If fictional objects really don't exist, then they aren't abstract objects [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / a. Ontological commitment
12449 Modern metaphysics often derives ontology from the logical forms of sentences [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / b. Commitment of quantifiers
12440 If objectual quantifiers ontologically commit, so does the metalanguage for its semantics [Azzouni]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
12438 In the vernacular there is no unequivocal ontological commitment [Azzouni]
12441 We only get ontology from semantics if we have already smuggled it in [Azzouni]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 4. Impossible objects
12448 Things that don't exist don't have any properties [Azzouni]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / b. Relative time
2608 For McTaggart time is seen either as fixed, or as relative to events [McTaggart, by Ayer]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / i. Denying time
22936 A-series time positions are contradictory, and yet all events occupy all of them! [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
4231 Time involves change, only the A-series explains change, but it involves contradictions, so time is unreal [McTaggart, by Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / a. Experience of time
8591 There could be no time if nothing changed [McTaggart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
22935 The B-series can be inferred from the A-series, but not the other way round [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
7802 A-series uses past, present and future; B-series uses 'before' and 'after' [McTaggart, by Girle]
4230 A-series expressions place things in time, and their truth varies; B-series is relative, and always true [McTaggart, by Lowe]
15199 The B-series must depend on the A-series, because change must be explained [McTaggart, by Le Poidevin]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 3. Periodic Table
12450 The periodic table not only defines the elements, but also excludes other possible elements [Azzouni]