41 ideas
| 14052 | Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus] |
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
| 14062 | Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus] |
| 1837 | We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
| 1836 | Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus] |
| 14061 | Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus] |
| 14054 | Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus] |
| 14053 | It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus] |
| 14055 | The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus] |
| 14057 | All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus] |
| 14058 | Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus] |
| 1833 | Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus] |
| 14063 | Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus] |
| 14059 | The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus] |
| 1835 | True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus] |
| 14056 | We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus] |
| 14060 | Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus] |
| 15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer] |