Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Consequence', 'Necessity, Essence and Individuation' and 'Intro to 'Essays on Actions and Events''

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
15169 Metaphysics is clarifying how we speak and think (and possibly improving it) [Sidelle]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
15164 We seem to base necessities on thought experiments and imagination [Sidelle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
10688 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10690 Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691 Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10695 Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689 A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696 A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693 Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10692 Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / d. Dispositions as occurrent
15180 There doesn't seem to be anything in the actual world that can determine modal facts [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 2. Types of Essence
15184 Causal reference presupposes essentialism if it refers to modally extended entities [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / c. Essentials are necessary
15172 Clearly, essential predications express necessary properties [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
15181 Being a deepest explanatory feature is an actual, not a modal property [Sidelle]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
15173 That the essence of water is its microstructure is a convention, not a discovery [Sidelle]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 3. Relative Identity
15185 We aren't clear about 'same stuff as this', so a principle of individuation is needed to identify it [Sidelle]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
15175 Evaluation of de dicto modalities does not depend on the identity of its objects [Sidelle]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
15032 Necessary a posteriori is conventional for necessity and nonmodal for a posteriority [Sidelle, by Sider]
15179 To know empirical necessities, we need empirical facts, plus conventions about which are necessary [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
15171 The necessary a posteriori is statements either of identity or of essence [Sidelle]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
15167 Empiricism explores necessities and concept-limits by imagining negations of truths [Sidelle]
15177 Contradictoriness limits what is possible and what is imaginable [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
15176 The individuals and kinds involved in modality are also a matter of convention [Sidelle]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
15174 A thing doesn't need transworld identity prior to rigid reference - that could be a convention of the reference [Sidelle]
15183 'Dthat' operates to make a singular term into a rigid term [Sidelle]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
15165 A priori knowledge is entirely of analytic truths [Sidelle]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
6383 Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
15168 That water is essentially H2O in some way concerns how we use 'water' [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
15166 Causal reference seems to get directly at the object, thus leaving its nature open [Sidelle]
19. Language / B. Reference / 5. Speaker's Reference
15182 Because some entities overlap, reference must have analytic individuation principles [Sidelle]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
6385 The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
6384 The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
15178 Can anything in science reveal the necessity of what it discovers? [Sidelle]