81 ideas
16227 | Philosophers are good at denying the obvious [Hawley] |
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
9449 | The plausible Barcan formula implies modality in the actual world [Bird] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
16216 | Part of the sense of a proper name is a criterion of the thing's identity [Hawley] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
9501 | If all existents are causally active, that excludes abstracta and causally isolated objects [Bird] |
9500 | If naturalism refers to supervenience, that leaves necessary entities untouched [Bird] |
16211 | A homogeneous rotating disc should be undetectable according to Humean supervenience [Hawley] |
16219 | Non-linguistic things cannot be indeterminate, because they don't have truth-values at all [Hawley] |
16223 | Maybe for the world to be vague, it must be vague in its foundations? [Hawley] |
16226 | Epistemic vagueness seems right in the case of persons [Hawley] |
16208 | Supervaluation refers to one vaguely specified thing, through satisfaction by everything in some range [Hawley] |
16221 | Supervaluationism takes what the truth-value would have been if indecision was resolved [Hawley] |
16230 | Maybe the only properties are basic ones like charge, mass and spin [Hawley] |
9502 | There might be just one fundamental natural property [Bird] |
9477 | Categorical properties are not modally fixed, but change across possible worlds [Bird] |
9490 | The categoricalist idea is that a property is only individuated by being itself [Bird] |
9495 | If we abstractly define a property, that doesn't mean some object could possess it [Bird] |
9492 | Categoricalists take properties to be quiddities, with no essential difference between them [Bird] |
9503 | To name an abundant property is either a Fregean concept, or a simple predicate [Bird] |
14540 | Only real powers are fundamental [Bird, by Mumford/Anjum] |
9450 | If all properties are potencies, and stimuli and manifestation characterise them, there is a regress [Bird] |
9498 | The essence of a potency involves relations, e.g. mass, to impressed force and acceleration [Bird] |
9474 | A disposition is finkish if a time delay might mean the manifestation fizzles out [Bird] |
9475 | A robust pot attached to a sensitive bomb is not fragile, but if struck it will easily break [Bird] |
9499 | Megarian actualists deny unmanifested dispositions [Bird] |
9486 | Why should a universal's existence depend on instantiation in an existing particular? [Bird] |
9472 | Resemblance itself needs explanation, presumably in terms of something held in common [Bird] |
16232 | An object is 'natural' if its stages are linked by certain non-supervenient relations [Hawley] |
16200 | Are sortals spatially maximal - so no cat part is allowed to be a cat? [Hawley] |
16237 | The modal features of statue and lump are disputed; when does it stop being that statue? [Hawley] |
16238 | Perdurantists can adopt counterpart theory, to explain modal differences of identical part-sums [Hawley] |
16220 | Vagueness is either in our knowledge, in our talk, or in reality [Hawley] |
16222 | Indeterminacy in objects and in properties are not distinct cases [Hawley] |
16228 | The constitution theory is endurantism plus more than one object in a place [Hawley] |
16229 | Constitution theory needs sortal properties like 'being a sweater' to distinguish it from its thread [Hawley] |
14492 | If the constitution view says thread and sweater are two things, why do we talk of one thing? [Hawley] |
16193 | 'Adverbialism' explains change by saying an object has-at-some-time a given property [Hawley] |
16195 | Presentism solves the change problem: the green banana ceases, so can't 'relate' to the yellow one [Hawley] |
16202 | The problem of change arises if there must be 'identity' of a thing over time [Hawley] |
16192 | Endurance theory can relate properties to times, or timed instantiations to properties [Hawley] |
16196 | Endurance is a sophisticated theory, covering properties, instantiation and time [Hawley] |
16197 | How does perdurance theory explain our concern for our own future selves? [Hawley] |
16191 | Perdurance needs an atemporal perspective, to say that the object 'has' different temporal parts [Hawley] |
16199 | If an object is the sum of all of its temporal parts, its mass is staggeringly large! [Hawley] |
16201 | Perdurance says things are sums of stages; Stage Theory says each stage is the thing [Hawley] |
16240 | If a life is essentially the sum of its temporal parts, it couldn't be shorter or longer than it was? [Hawley] |
16206 | Stages must be as fine-grained in length as change itself, so any change is a new stage [Hawley] |
16203 | Stage Theory seems to miss out the link between stages of the same object [Hawley] |
16204 | Stage Theory says every stage is a distinct object, which gives too many objects [Hawley] |
16212 | An isolated stage can't be a banana (which involves suitable relations to other stages) [Hawley] |
16213 | Stages of one thing are related by extrinsic counterfactual and causal relations [Hawley] |
16205 | The stages of Stage Theory seem too thin to populate the world, or to be referred to [Hawley] |
16225 | If two things might be identical, there can't be something true of one and false of the other [Hawley] |
9482 | If the laws necessarily imply p, that doesn't give a new 'nomological' necessity [Bird] |
9481 | Logical necessitation is not a kind of necessity; George Orwell not being Eric Blair is not a real possibility [Bird] |
9505 | Empiricist saw imaginability and possibility as close, but now they seem remote [Bird] |
16239 | To decide whether something is a counterpart, we need to specify a relevant sortal concept [Hawley] |
9491 | Haecceitism says identity is independent of qualities and without essence [Bird] |
9487 | We can't reject all explanations because of a regress; inexplicable A can still explain B [Bird] |
16218 | On any theory of self, it is hard to explain why we should care about our future selves [Hawley] |
9493 | We should explain causation by powers, not powers by causation [Bird] |
9494 | Singularism about causes is wrong, as the universals involved imply laws [Bird] |
16215 | Causation is nothing more than the counterfactuals it grounds? [Hawley] |
9507 | Laws are explanatory relationships of things, which supervene on their essences [Bird] |
9488 | Laws are either disposition regularities, or relations between properties [Bird] |
9496 | That other diamonds are hard does not explain why this one is [Bird] |
9479 | Dispositional essentialism says laws (and laws about laws) are guaranteed regularities [Bird] |
9473 | Laws cannot offer unified explanations if they don't involve universals [Bird] |
9484 | If the universals for laws must be instantiated, a vanishing particular could destroy a law [Bird] |
9506 | Salt necessarily dissolves in water, because of the law which makes the existence of salt possible [Bird] |
23713 | Most laws supervene on fundamental laws, which are explained by basic powers [Bird, by Friend/Kimpton-Nye] |
9489 | Essentialism can't use conditionals to explain regularities, because of possible interventions [Bird] |
9504 | The relational view of space-time doesn't cover times and places where things could be [Bird] |
16207 | Time could be discrete (like integers) or dense (rationals) or continuous (reals) [Hawley] |