Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Consequence', 'talk' and 'New system of communication of substances'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
10688 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 3. Value of Logic
10152 Set theory and logic are fairy tales, but still worth studying [Tarski]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10690 Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691 Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10695 Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689 A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696 A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693 Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10692 Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
13169 I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz]
13168 My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
10151 I am a deeply convinced nominalist [Tarski]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
13170 The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / c. Types of substance
13171 Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
13167 We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz]