60 ideas
14052 | Begin philosophy when you are young, and keep going when you are old [Epicurus] |
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
14480 | Maybe analytic truths do not require truth-makers, as they place no demands on the world [Thomasson] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
14471 | Analytical entailments arise from combinations of meanings and inference rules [Thomasson] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
14493 | Existence might require playing a role in explanation, or in a causal story, or being composed in some way [Thomasson] |
14491 | Rival ontological claims can both be true, if there are analytic relationships between them [Thomasson] |
14489 | Theories do not avoid commitment to entities by avoiding certain terms or concepts [Thomasson] |
14485 | Ordinary objects may be not indispensable, but they are nearly unavoidable [Thomasson] |
14487 | The simple existence conditions for objects are established by our practices, and are met [Thomasson] |
21651 | It is analytic that if simples are arranged chair-wise, then there is a chair [Thomasson, by Hofweber] |
14467 | Ordinary objects are rejected, to avoid contradictions, or for greater economy in thought [Thomasson] |
14479 | To individuate people we need conventions, but conventions are made up by people [Thomasson] |
14486 | Eliminativists haven't found existence conditions for chairs, beyond those of the word 'chair' [Thomasson] |
14481 | Wherever an object exists, there are intrinsic properties instantiating every modal profile [Thomasson] |
14482 | If the statue and the lump are two objects, they require separate properties, so we could add their masses [Thomasson] |
14483 | Given the similarity of statue and lump, what could possibly ground their modal properties? [Thomasson] |
14476 | Identity claims between objects are only well-formed if the categories are specified [Thomasson] |
14477 | Identical entities must be of the same category, and meet the criteria for the category [Thomasson] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
14478 | Modal Conventionalism says modality is analytic, not intrinsic to the world, and linguistic [Thomasson] |
14466 | A chief task of philosophy is making reflective sense of our common sense worldview [Thomasson] |
14062 | Sooner follow mythology, than accept the 'fate' of natural philosophers [Epicurus] |
1837 | We should not refer things to irresponsible necessity, but either to fortune or to our own will [Epicurus] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
14475 | How can causal theories of reference handle nonexistence claims? [Thomasson] |
14474 | Pure causal theories of reference have the 'qua problem', of what sort of things is being referred to [Thomasson] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
14488 | Analyticity is revealed through redundancy, as in 'He bought a house and a building' [Thomasson] |
1836 | Prudence is more valuable than philosophy, because it avoids confusions of the soul [Epicurus] |
14061 | Our own choices are autonomous, and the basis for praise and blame [Epicurus] |
14053 | It is absurd to fear the pain of death when you are not even facing it [Epicurus] |
14055 | The wisdom that produces a good life also produces a good death [Epicurus] |
14054 | Fearing death is absurd, because we are not present when it occurs [Epicurus] |
1833 | Pleasure is the first good in life [Epicurus] |
14058 | Pleasure is the goal, but as lack of pain and calm mind, not as depraved or greedy pleasure [Epicurus] |
14057 | All pleasures are good, but it is not always right to choose them [Epicurus] |
14063 | Sooner a good decision going wrong, than a bad one turning out for the good [Epicurus] |
14059 | The best life is not sensuality, but rational choice and healthy opinion [Epicurus] |
1835 | True pleasure is not debauchery, but freedom from physical and mental pain [Epicurus] |
14056 | We only need pleasure when we have the pain of desire [Epicurus] |
14060 | Prudence is the greatest good, and more valuable than philosophy, because it produces virtue [Epicurus] |