Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Consequence', 'fragments/reports' and 'Identity and Necessity'

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18 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / b. Names as descriptive
We may fix the reference of 'Cicero' by a description, but thereafter the name is rigid [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
The function of names is simply to refer [Kripke]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 3. A Posteriori Necessary
It is necessary that this table is not made of ice, but we don't know it a priori [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / b. Rigid designation
A 'rigid designator' designates the same object in all possible worlds [Kripke]
We cannot say that Nixon might have been a different man from the one he actually was [Kripke]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
Modal statements about this table never refer to counterparts; that confuses epistemology and metaphysics [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
Identity theorists must deny that pains can be imagined without brain states [Kripke]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / e. Modal argument
Pain, unlike heat, is picked out by an essential property [Kripke]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 5. Infinite in Nature
Archelaus was the first person to say that the universe is boundless [Archelaus, by Diog. Laertius]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Archelaus said life began in a primeval slime [Archelaus, by Schofield]