30 ideas
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
10631 | If 'x is heterological' iff it does not apply to itself, then 'heterological' is heterological if it isn't heterological [Hale/Wright] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
10624 | The incompletability of formal arithmetic reveals that logic also cannot be completely characterized [Hale/Wright] |
10629 | If structures are relative, this undermines truth-value and objectivity [Hale/Wright] |
10628 | The structural view of numbers doesn't fit their usage outside arithmetical contexts [Hale/Wright] |
10622 | The neo-Fregean is more optimistic than Frege about contextual definitions of numbers [Hale/Wright] |
10626 | Objects just are what singular terms refer to [Hale/Wright] |
6685 | 'Subjectivism' is an extension of relativism from the social group to the individual [Graham] |
10630 | Abstracted objects are not mental creations, but depend on equivalence between given entities [Hale/Wright] |
10627 | Many conceptual truths ('yellow is extended') are not analytic, as derived from logic and definitions [Hale/Wright] |
6699 | The chain of consequences may not be the same as the chain of responsibility [Graham] |
6698 | Negative consequences are very hard (and possibly impossible) to assess [Graham] |
6700 | We can't criticise people because of unforeseeable consequences [Graham] |
6704 | Egoism submits to desires, but cannot help form them [Graham] |
6701 | Rescue operations need spontaneous benevolence, not careful thought [Graham] |
6693 | 'What if everybody did that?' rather misses the point as an objection to cheating [Graham] |
6691 | It is more plausible to say people can choose between values, than that they can create them [Graham] |
6688 | Life is only absurd if you expected an explanation and none turns up [Graham] |
6705 | Existentialism may transcend our nature, unlike eudaimonism [Graham] |
6690 | A standard problem for existentialism is the 'sincere Nazi' [Graham] |
6689 | The key to existentialism: the way you make choices is more important than what you choose [Graham] |
6706 | The great religions are much more concerned with the religious life than with ethics [Graham] |
6709 | Western religion saves us from death; Eastern religion saves us from immortality [Graham] |