57 ideas
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 8187 | Frege was strongly in favour of taking truth to attach to propositions [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 18772 | We can treat designation by a few words as a proper name [Frege] |
| 10424 | A Fregean proper name has a sense determining an object, instead of a concept [Frege, by Sainsbury] |
| 18773 | People may have different senses for 'Aristotle', like 'pupil of Plato' or 'teacher of Alexander' [Frege] |
| 14075 | Proper name in modal contexts refer obliquely, to their usual sense [Frege, by Gibbard] |
| 4978 | The meaning of a proper name is the designated object [Frege] |
| 10510 | Frege ascribes reference to incomplete expressions, as well as to singular terms [Frege, by Hale] |
| 18937 | If sentences have a 'sense', empty name sentences can be understood that way [Frege, by Sawyer] |
| 18940 | It is a weakness of natural languages to contain non-denoting names [Frege] |
| 18939 | In a logically perfect language every well-formed proper name designates an object [Frege] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 9462 | Frege is intensionalist about reference, as it is determined by sense; identity of objects comes first [Frege, by Jacquette] |
| 18936 | Frege moved from extensional to intensional semantics when he added the idea of 'sense' [Frege, by Sawyer] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 21570 | Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away [Russell] |
| 10533 | We can't get a semantics from nouns and predicates referring to the same thing [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4893 | Frege was asking how identities could be informative [Frege, by Perry] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 18752 | 'The concept "horse"' denotes a concept, yet seems also to denote an object [Frege, by McGee] |
| 22318 | Frege failed to show when two sets of truth-conditions are equivalent [Frege, by Potter] |
| 4980 | The meaning (reference) of a sentence is its truth value - the circumstance of it being true or false [Frege] |
| 9180 | Holism says all language use is also a change in the rules of language [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4981 | The reference of a word should be understood as part of the reference of the sentence [Frege] |
| 15597 | Frege's Puzzle: from different semantics we infer different reference for two names with the same reference [Frege, by Fine,K] |
| 17002 | Frege's 'sense' is ambiguous, between the meaning of a designator, and how it fixes reference [Kripke on Frege] |
| 18778 | Every descriptive name has a sense, but may not have a reference [Frege] |
| 7805 | Frege started as anti-realist, but the sense/reference distinction led him to realism [Frege, by Benardete,JA] |
| 4976 | The meaning (reference) of 'evening star' is the same as that of 'morning star', but not the sense [Frege] |
| 4977 | In maths, there are phrases with a clear sense, but no actual reference [Frege] |
| 4979 | We are driven from sense to reference by our desire for truth [Frege] |
| 15155 | Expressions always give ways of thinking of referents, rather than the referents themselves [Frege, by Soames] |
| 11126 | 'Sense' gives meaning to non-referring names, and to two expressions for one referent [Frege, by Margolis/Laurence] |
| 8164 | Frege was the first to construct a plausible theory of meaning [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 9817 | Earlier Frege focuses on content itself; later he became interested in understanding content [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 8171 | Frege divided the meaning of a sentence into sense, force and tone [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4954 | Frege uses 'sense' to mean both a designator's meaning, and the way its reference is determined [Kripke on Frege] |
| 7304 | Frege explained meaning as sense, semantic value, reference, force and tone [Frege, by Miller,A] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |