23 ideas
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
13011 | New axioms are being sought, to determine the size of the continuum [Maddy] |
13014 | Extensional sets are clearer, simpler, unique and expressive [Maddy] |
13013 | The Axiom of Extensionality seems to be analytic [Maddy] |
13021 | The Axiom of Infinity states Cantor's breakthrough that launched modern mathematics [Maddy] |
13022 | Infinite sets are essential for giving an account of the real numbers [Maddy] |
13023 | The Power Set Axiom is needed for, and supported by, accounts of the continuum [Maddy] |
13024 | Efforts to prove the Axiom of Choice have failed [Maddy] |
13025 | Modern views say the Choice set exists, even if it can't be constructed [Maddy] |
13026 | A large array of theorems depend on the Axiom of Choice [Maddy] |
13019 | The Iterative Conception says everything appears at a stage, derived from the preceding appearances [Maddy] |
13018 | Limitation of Size is a vague intuition that over-large sets may generate paradoxes [Maddy] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |