Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Consequence', 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions' and 'The Meaning of 'Meaning''

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22 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
10688 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10690 Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691 Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10695 Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689 A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696 A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693 Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10692 Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 15. Against Essentialism
18890 Putnam smuggles essentialism about liquids into his proof that water must be H2O [Salmon,N on Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / b. Qualia and intentionality
7705 The Twin Earth theory suggests that intentionality is independent of qualia [Jacquette on Putnam]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
4099 If Twins talking about 'water' and 'XYZ' have different thoughts but identical heads, then thoughts aren't in the head [Putnam, by Crane]
12026 We say ice and steam are different forms of water, but not that they are different forms of H2O [Forbes,G on Putnam]
3208 Does 'water' mean a particular substance that was 'dubbed'? [Putnam, by Rey]
19. Language / B. Reference / 4. Descriptive Reference / a. Sense and reference
3893 Often reference determines sense, and not (as Frege thought) vice versa [Putnam, by Scruton]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
6613 The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
11191 The hidden structure of a natural kind determines membership in all possible worlds [Putnam]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
6616 Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
11192 If causes are the essence of diseases, then disease is an example of a relational essence [Putnam, by Williams,NE]
11190 Archimedes meant by 'gold' the hidden structure or essence of the stuff [Putnam]
6615 A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
6614 A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
6612 Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]