14 ideas
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
1868 | The world was made as much for animals as for man [Celsus] |
14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
1867 | Christians presented Jesus as a new kind of logos to oppose that of the philosophers [Celsus] |