85 ideas
3807 | Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume] |
22285 | Impredicative definitions are circular, but fine for picking out, rather than creating something [Potter] |
22301 | The Identity Theory says a proposition is true if it coincides with what makes it true [Potter] |
22324 | It has been unfortunate that externalism about truth is equated with correspondence [Potter] |
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
22279 | Frege's sign |--- meant judgements, but the modern |- turnstile means inference, with intecedents [Potter] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
22291 | Deductivism can't explain how the world supports unconditional conclusions [Potter] |
22295 | Modern logical truths are true under all interpretations of the non-logical words [Potter] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
8649 | Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume] |
22310 | The formalist defence against Gödel is to reject his metalinguistic concept of truth [Potter] |
22298 | Why is fictional arithmetic applicable to the real world? [Potter] |
21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume] |
22287 | If 'concrete' is the negative of 'abstract', that means desires and hallucinations are concrete [Potter] |
22284 | 'Greater than', which is the ancestral of 'successor', strictly orders the natural numbers [Potter] |
11942 | Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume] |
11949 | There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume] |
11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume] |
11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume] |
11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine] |
7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume] |
21293 | Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume] |
12048 | The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume] |
13424 | Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume] |
21299 | Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume] |
21300 | A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume] |
1321 | If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume] |
1330 | If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume] |
21302 | If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume] |
21303 | We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume] |
21301 | The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume] |
21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume] |
1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume] |
21289 | 'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume] |
21292 | Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume] |
9428 | Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume] |
4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume] |
22281 | A material conditional cannot capture counterfactual reasoning [Potter] |
6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
22327 | Knowledge from a drunken schoolteacher is from a reliable and unreliable process [Potter] |
12417 | Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume] |
5548 | Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant] |
7446 | The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking] |
21806 | Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume] |
3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
1316 | Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume] |
1333 | Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume] |
1332 | We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume] |
21305 | Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume] |
21307 | Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume] |
21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume] |
21294 | A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume] |
21295 | When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume] |
21298 | We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume] |
21304 | Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume] |
22273 | Traditionally there are twelve categories of judgement, in groups of three [Potter] |
22290 | The phrase 'the concept "horse"' can't refer to a concept, because it is saturated [Potter] |
22283 | Compositionality should rely on the parsing tree, which may contain more than sentence components [Potter] |
22282 | 'Direct compositonality' says the components wholly explain a sentence meaning [Potter] |
22296 | Compositionality is more welcome in logic than in linguistics (which is more contextual) [Potter] |
20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall] |
6692 | For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham] |
8257 | Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume] |
22374 | You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume] |
22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C] |
8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume] |
4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume] |
3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume] |
14301 | We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume] |
8382 | For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane] |
19274 | Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume] |
21296 | If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume] |