14 ideas
| 10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
| 10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
| 10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
| 10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
| 10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
| 10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
| 10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
| 17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
| 17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
| 17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
| 17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
| 8433 | There are few traces of an event before it happens, but many afterwards [Lewis, by Horwich] |
| 17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |