38 ideas
6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
16665 | There are entities, and then positive 'modes', modifying aspects outside the thing's essence [Suárez] |
16666 | A mode determines the state and character of a quantity, without adding to it [Suárez] |
16667 | Substances are incomplete unless they have modes [Suárez, by Pasnau] |
17007 | Forms must rule over faculties and accidents, and are the source of action and unity [Suárez] |
16780 | Partial forms of leaf and fruit are united in the whole form of the tree [Suárez] |
16758 | The best support for substantial forms is the co-ordinated unity of a natural being [Suárez] |
16743 | We can get at the essential nature of 'quantity' by knowing bulk and extension [Suárez] |
16742 | We only know essences through non-essential features, esp. those closest to the essence [Suárez] |
22143 | Identity does not exclude possible or imagined difference [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22144 | Real Essential distinction: A and B are of different natural kinds [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22146 | Minor Real distinction: B needs A, but A doesn't need B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22145 | Major Real distinction: A and B have independent existences [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22147 | Conceptual/Mental distinction: one thing can be conceived of in two different ways [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22148 | Modal distinction: A isn't B or its property, but still needs B [Suárez, by Boulter] |
22149 | Scholastics assess possibility by what has actually happened in reality [Suárez, by Boulter] |
6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
16682 | Other things could occupy the same location as an angel [Suárez] |