41 ideas
| 13560 | A wise man is not subservient to anything [Seneca] |
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 18901 | Truthmakers are facts 'of' a domain, not something 'in' the domain [Sommers] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 18904 | 'Predicable' terms come in charged pairs, with one the negation of the other [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18895 | Logic which maps ordinary reasoning must be transparent, and free of variables [Sommers] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 18897 | Predicate logic has to spell out that its identity relation '=' is an equivalent relation [Sommers] |
| 18893 | Translating into quantificational idiom offers no clues as to how ordinary thinkers reason [Sommers] |
| 18903 | Sommers promotes the old idea that negation basically refers to terms [Sommers, by Engelbretsen] |
| 18894 | Predicates form a hierarchy, from the most general, down to names at the bottom [Sommers] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 18900 | Unfortunately for realists, modern logic cannot say that some fact exists [Sommers] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 18898 | In standard logic, names are the only way to refer [Sommers] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
| 13558 | The supreme good is harmony of spirit [Seneca] |
| 13559 | I seek virtue, because it is its own reward [Seneca] |
| 13561 | Virtue is always moderate, so excess need not be feared [Seneca] |
| 13562 | It is shameful to not even recognise your own slaves [Seneca] |
| 13564 | There is far more scope for virtue if you are wealthy; poverty only allows endurance [Seneca] |
| 13565 | If wealth was a good, it would make men good [Seneca] |
| 13563 | Why does your wife wear in her ears the income of a wealthy house? [Seneca] |
| 13557 | Unfortunately the majority do not tend to favour what is best [Seneca] |