Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Consequence', 'Types and Ontology' and 'Essays on Active Powers 4: Liberty of Agents'

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15 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
10688 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10690 Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691 Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10695 Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689 A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696 A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693 Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10692 Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 1. Categories
13127 Categories can't overlap; they are either disjoint, or inclusive [Sommers, by Westerhoff]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
23681 The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 3. Constraints on the will
23676 A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 4. For Free Will
23680 We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / a. Practical reason
23678 A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / a. Constant conjunction
23677 We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
23679 The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid]