97 ideas
18290 | But what is the reasoning of the body, that it requires the wisdom you seek? [Nietzsche] |
18559 | Philosophy is empty if it does not in some way depend on matters of fact [Machery] |
18303 | Reject wisdom that lacks laughter [Nietzsche] |
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
18305 | To love truth, you must know how to lie [Nietzsche] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
18564 | Do categories store causal knowledge, or typical properties, or knowledge of individuals? [Machery] |
18604 | Are quick and slow categorisation the same process, or quite different? [Machery] |
18573 | For each category of objects (such as 'dog') an individual seems to have several concepts [Machery] |
18602 | A thing is classified if its features are likely to be generated by that category's causal laws [Machery] |
18565 | There may be ad hoc categories, such as the things to pack in your suitcase for a trip [Machery] |
18570 | There may be several ways to individuate things like concepts [Machery] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
18616 | If a term doesn't pick out a kind, keeping it may block improvements in classification [Machery] |
18614 | Vertical arguments say eliminate a term if it picks out different natural kinds in different theories [Machery] |
18615 | Horizontal arguments say eliminate a term if it fails to pick out a natural kind [Machery] |
18609 | Psychologists use 'induction' as generalising a property from one category to another [Machery] |
18610 | 'Ampliative' induction infers that all members of a category have a feature found in some of them [Machery] |
20757 | The powerful self behind your thoughts and feelings is your body [Nietzsche] |
18289 | Forget the word 'I'; 'I' is performed by the intelligence of your body [Nietzsche] |
18562 | Connectionists cannot distinguish concept-memories from their background, or the processes [Machery] |
18561 | We can identify a set of cognitive capacities which are 'higher order' [Machery] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
18574 | Concepts for categorisation and for induction may be quite different [Machery] |
18588 | Concept theories aim at their knowledge, processes, format, acquisition, and location [Machery] |
18611 | We should abandon 'concept', and just use 'prototype', 'exemplar' and 'theory' [Machery] |
18567 | In the philosophy of psychology, concepts are usually introduced as constituents of thoughts [Machery] |
18569 | In philosophy theories of concepts explain how our propositional attitudes have content [Machery] |
18563 | By 'concept' psychologists mean various sorts of representation or structure [Machery] |
18558 | Concept theorists examine their knowledge, format, processes, acquisition and location [Machery] |
18557 | Psychologists treat concepts as long-term knowledge bodies which lead to judgements [Machery] |
18560 | Psychologist treat concepts as categories [Machery] |
18592 | The concepts OBJECT or AGENT may be innate [Machery] |
18566 | Concepts should contain working memory, not long-term, because they control behaviour [Machery] |
18584 | One hybrid theory combines a core definition with a prototype for identification [Machery] |
18585 | Heterogeneous concepts might have conflicting judgements, where hybrid theories will not [Machery] |
18578 | Concepts as definitions was rejected, and concepts as prototypes, exemplars or theories proposed [Machery] |
18575 | The concepts for a class typically include prototypes, and exemplars, and theories [Machery] |
18591 | Classical theory can't explain facts like typical examples being categorised quicker [Machery] |
18583 | Many categories don't seem to have a definition [Machery] |
18590 | Classical theory implies variety in processing times, but this does not generally occur [Machery] |
18594 | Knowing typical properties of things is especially useful in induction [Machery] |
18593 | The term 'prototype' is used for both typical category members, and the representation [Machery] |
18595 | Prototype theories are based on computation of similarities with the prototype [Machery] |
18596 | Prototype theorists don't tell us how we select the appropriate prototype [Machery] |
18603 | Maybe concepts are not the typical properties, but the ideal properties [Machery] |
18605 | It is more efficient to remember the prototype, than repeatedly create it from exemplars [Machery] |
18606 | The prototype view predicts that typical members are easier to categorise [Machery] |
18597 | Concepts as exemplars are based on the knowledge of properties of each particular [Machery] |
18598 | Exemplar theories need to explain how the relevant properties are selected from a multitude of them [Machery] |
18599 | In practice, known examples take priority over the rest of the set of exemplars [Machery] |
18600 | Theory Theory says category concepts are knowledge stores explaining membership [Machery] |
18601 | Theory Theory says concepts are explanatory knowledge, and concepts form domains [Machery] |
18607 | Theory theorists rely on best explanation, rather than on similarities [Machery] |
18608 | If categorisation is not by similarity, it seems to rely on what properties things might have [Machery] |
18587 | The theory account is sometimes labelled as 'knowledge' or 'explanation' in approach [Machery] |
18577 | The word 'grandmother' may be two concepts, with a prototype and a definition [Machery] |
18589 | For behaviourists concepts are dispositions to link category members to names [Machery] |
18612 | Americans are more inclined to refer causally than the Chinese are [Machery] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
18299 | The will is constantly frustrated by the past [Nietzsche] |
18297 | We created meanings, to maintain ourselves [Nietzsche] |
18293 | The noble man wants new virtues; the good man preserves what is old [Nietzsche] |
18301 | We only really love children and work [Nietzsche] |
18307 | I want my work, not happiness! [Nietzsche] |
18291 | Virtues can destroy one another, through jealousy [Nietzsche] |
18287 | People now find both wealth and poverty too much of a burden [Nietzsche] |
18295 | If you want friends, you must be a fighter [Nietzsche] |
18286 | The greatest experience possible is contempt for your own happiness, reason and virtue [Nietzsche] |
18296 | An enduring people needs its own individual values [Nietzsche] |
18294 | The state coldly claims that it is the people, but that is a lie [Nietzsche] |
18304 | Saints want to live as they desire, or not to live at all [Nietzsche] |
18300 | Whenever we have seen suffering, we have wanted the revenge of punishment [Nietzsche] |
18302 | Man and woman are deeply strange to one another! [Nietzsche] |
18613 | Artifacts can be natural kinds, when they are the object of historical enquiry [Machery] |
18292 | I can only believe in a God who can dance [Nietzsche] |
18298 | Not being a god is insupportable, so there are no gods! [Nietzsche] |
18288 | Heaven was invented by the sick and the dying [Nietzsche] |
18306 | We don't want heaven; now that we are men, we want the kingdom of earth [Nietzsche] |