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All the ideas for 'Logical Pluralism', 'Fragments from 1885-1886' and 'Consciousness'

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79 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
Different abilities are needed for living in an incomplete and undogmatic system [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 4. Conceptual Analysis
Bad writers use shapeless floating splotches of concepts [Nietzsche]
1. Philosophy / H. Continental Philosophy / 3. Hermeneutics
A text has many interpretations, but no 'correct' one [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 3. Value of Truth
What is the search for truth if it isn't moral? [Nietzsche]
Like all philosophers, I love truth [Nietzsche]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
(∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall]
It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall]
Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall]
A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
Physicalism requires the naturalisation or rejection of set theory [Lycan]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 1. Ontology of Logic
Logic is a fiction, which invents the view that one thought causes another [Nietzsche]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / d. The Preface paradox
Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / a. Numbers
Numbers enable us to manage the world - to the limits of counting [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Events are just interpretations of groups of appearances [Nietzsche]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
Institutions are not reducible as types, but they are as tokens [Lycan]
Types cannot be reduced, but levels of reduction are varied groupings of the same tokens [Lycan]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
One location may contain molecules, a metal strip, a key, an opener of doors, and a human tragedy [Lycan]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
I see the 'role'/'occupant' distinction as fundamental to metaphysics [Lycan]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 5. Cogito Critique
The 'I' does not think; it is a construction of thinking, like other useful abstractions [Nietzsche]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
I think greenness is a complex microphysical property of green objects [Lycan]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Appearance is the sole reality of things, to which all predicates refer [Nietzsche]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
Memory is essential, and is only possible by means of abbreviation signs [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Schematic minds think thoughts are truer if they slot into a scheme [Nietzsche]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 1. Relativism
Each of our personal drives has its own perspective [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
The mind is a simplifying apparatus [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Consciousness is our awareness of our own mental life [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / a. Nature of intentionality
Intentionality comes in degrees [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 4. Intentionality / b. Intentionality theories
Teleological views allow for false intentional content, unlike causal and nomological theories [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 5. Qualia / c. Explaining qualia
Pain is composed of urges, desires, impulses etc, at different levels of abstraction [Lycan]
The right 'level' for qualia is uncertain, though top (behaviourism) and bottom (particles) are false [Lycan]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
Minds have an excluding drive to scare things off, and a selecting one to filter facts [Nietzsche]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 10. Conatus/Striving
The greatest drive of life is to discharge strength, rather than preservation [Nietzsche]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
That all events are necessary does not mean they are compelled [Nietzsche]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 8. Dualism of Mind Critique
If energy in the brain disappears into thin air, this breaches physical conservation laws [Lycan]
In lower animals, psychology is continuous with chemistry, and humans are continuous with animals [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Two behaviourists meet. The first says,"You're fine; how am I?" [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 1. Functionalism
If functionalism focuses on folk psychology, it ignores lower levels of function [Lycan]
Functionalism must not be too abstract to allow inverted spectrum, or so structural that it becomes chauvinistic [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 2. Machine Functionalism
The distinction between software and hardware is not clear in computing [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
Mental types are a subclass of teleological types at a high level of functional abstraction [Lycan]
Teleological characterisations shade off smoothly into brutely physical ones [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Identity theory is functionalism, but located at the lowest level of abstraction [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
We reduce the mind through homuncular groups, described abstractly by purpose [Lycan]
Teleological functionalism helps us to understand psycho-biological laws [Lycan]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
A Martian may exhibit human-like behaviour while having very different sensations [Lycan]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
Concepts are rough groups of simultaneous sensations [Nietzsche]
Concepts don’t match one thing, but many things a little bit [Nietzsche]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
Whatever their origin, concepts survive by being useful [Nietzsche]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Thought starts as ambiguity, in need of interpretation and narrowing [Nietzsche]
Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
21. Aesthetics / A. Aesthetic Experience / 1. Aesthetics
Aesthetics can be more basic than morality, in our pleasure in certain patterns of experience [Nietzsche]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / f. Übermensch
Caesar and Napoleon point to the future, when they pursue their task regardless of human sacrifice [Nietzsche]
Napoleon was very focused, and rightly ignored compassion [Nietzsche]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 2. Nihilism
For the strongest people, nihilism gives you wings! [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
The great question is approaching, of how to govern the earth as a whole [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / d. Elites
The controlling morality of aristocracy is the desire to resemble their ancestors [Nietzsche]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 14. Nationalism
People feel united as a nation by one language, but then want a common ancestry and history [Nietzsche]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
To be someone you need property, and wanting more is healthy [Nietzsche]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / b. Limited purposes
We need a notion of teleology that comes in degrees [Lycan]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 11. Against Laws of Nature
Laws of nature are actually formulas of power relations [Nietzsche]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Physical' means either figuring in physics descriptions, or just located in space-time [Lycan]
27. Natural Reality / F. Chemistry / 1. Chemistry
In chemistry every substance pushes, and thus creates new substances [Nietzsche]