Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Pluralism', 'Il Saggiatore ('The Assayer')' and 'Intrinsic and Extrinsic Properties'

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32 ideas

3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 4. Truthmaker Necessitarianism
Give up objects necessitating truths, and say their natures cause the truths? [Cameron]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / c. States of affairs make truths
Truthmaker requires a commitment to tropes or states of affairs, for contingent truths [Cameron]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
(∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall]
It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall]
Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall]
A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / d. The Preface paradox
Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Essentialists say intrinsic properties arise from what the thing is, irrespective of surroundings [Cameron]
An object's intrinsic properties are had in virtue of how it is, independently [Cameron]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 1. Objects over Time
Most criteria for identity over time seem to leave two later objects identical to the earlier one [Cameron]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
Heat and colour don't exist, so cannot mislead about the external world [Galileo, by Tuck]
Tastes, odours and colours only reside in consciousness, and would disappear with creatures [Galileo]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Galileo introduced geometrico-mechanical explanation, based on Archimedes [Galileo, by Machamer/Darden/Craver]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 4. Mathematical Nature
To understand the universe mathematics is essential [Galileo]