38 ideas
| 9247 | Life will be lived better if it has no meaning [Camus] |
| 6707 | Suicide - whether life is worth living - is the one serious philosophical problem [Camus] |
| 9245 | To an absurd mind reason is useless, and there is nothing beyond reason [Camus] |
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 9244 | Logic is easy, but what about logic to the point of death? [Camus] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 9249 | Whether we are free is uninteresting; we can only experience our freedom [Camus] |
| 9253 | The human heart has a tiresome tendency to label as fate only what crushes it [Camus] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 9381 | If some inferences are needed to fix meaning, but we don't know which, they are all relevant [Fodor/Lepore, by Boghossian] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
| 9250 | Discussing ethics is pointless; moral people behave badly, and integrity doesn't need rules [Camus] |
| 9252 | The more one loves the stronger the absurd grows [Camus] |
| 9251 | One can be virtuous through a whim [Camus] |
| 6708 | Happiness and the absurd go together, each leading to the other [Camus] |
| 9243 | If we believe existence is absurd, this should dictate our conduct [Camus] |
| 9242 | Essential problems either risk death, or intensify the passion of life [Camus] |
| 9246 | Danger and integrity are not in the leap of faith, but in remaining poised just before the leap [Camus] |
| 9248 | It is essential to die unreconciled and not of one's own free will [Camus] |