14 ideas
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
4304 | Descartes says there are two substance, Spinoza one, and Leibniz infinitely many [Cottingham] |
4303 | The notion of substance lies at the heart of rationalist metaphysics [Cottingham] |
4306 | For rationalists, it is necessary that effects be deducible from their causes [Cottingham] |