46 ideas
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 21339 | We want the ontology of relations, not just a formal way of specifying them [Heil] |
| 21349 | Two people are indirectly related by height; the direct relation is internal, between properties [Heil] |
| 21340 | Maybe all the other features of the world can be reduced to relations [Heil] |
| 21348 | In the case of 5 and 6, their relational truthmaker is just the numbers [Heil] |
| 21351 | Truthmaking is a clear example of an internal relation [Heil] |
| 21344 | If R internally relates a and b, and you have a and b, you thereby have R [Heil] |
| 21350 | If properties are powers, then causal relations are internal relations [Heil] |
| 20339 | Classes rarely share properties with their members - unlike universals and types [Wollheim] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 20338 | We often treat a type as if it were a sort of token [Wollheim] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
| 20342 | Interpretation is performance for some arts, and critical for all arts [Wollheim] |
| 20343 | A love of nature must precede a love of art [Wollheim] |
| 20348 | A criterion of identity for works of art would be easier than a definition [Wollheim] |
| 20347 | If beauty needs organisation, then totally simple things can't be beautiful [Wollheim] |
| 20345 | Some say art must have verbalisable expression, and others say the opposite! [Wollheim] |
| 20331 | It is claimed that the expressive properties of artworks are non-physical [Wollheim] |
| 20336 | Style can't be seen directly within a work, but appreciation needs a grasp of style [Wollheim] |
| 20337 | The traditional view is that knowledge of its genre to essential to appreciating literature [Wollheim] |
| 20333 | If artworks are not physical objects, they are either ideal entities, or collections of phenomena [Wollheim] |
| 20334 | The ideal theory says art is an intuition, shaped by a particular process, and presented in public [Wollheim] |
| 20335 | The ideal theory of art neglects both the audience and the medium employed [Wollheim] |
| 20340 | A musical performance has virtually the same features as the piece of music [Wollheim] |
| 20341 | An interpretation adds further properties to the generic piece of music [Wollheim] |
| 20332 | A drawing only represents Napoleon if the artist intended it to [Wollheim] |