60 ideas
| 17663 | If you know what it is, investigation is pointless. If you don't, investigation is impossible [Armstrong] |
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 11074 | 'It is true that this follows' means simply: this follows [Wittgenstein] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 11073 | Two and one making three has the necessity of logical inference [Wittgenstein] |
| 17688 | Negative facts are supervenient on positive facts, suggesting they are positive facts [Armstrong] |
| 17691 | Nothing is genuinely related to itself [Armstrong] |
| 17679 | All instances of some property are strictly identical [Armstrong] |
| 12677 | Armstrong holds that all basic properties are categorical [Armstrong, by Ellis] |
| 17666 | Actualism means that ontology cannot contain what is merely physically possible [Armstrong] |
| 17667 | Dispositions exist, but their truth-makers are actual or categorical properties [Armstrong] |
| 17687 | If everything is powers there is a vicious regress, as powers are defined by more powers [Armstrong] |
| 17678 | Universals are just the repeatable features of a world [Armstrong] |
| 17669 | Realist regularity theories of laws need universals, to pick out the same phenomena [Armstrong] |
| 17677 | Past, present and future must be equally real if universals are instantiated [Armstrong] |
| 17686 | Universals are abstractions from states of affairs [Armstrong] |
| 15442 | Universals are abstractions from their particular instances [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17668 | It is likely that particulars can be individuated by unique conjunctions of properties [Armstrong] |
| 17680 | The identity of a thing with itself can be ruled out as a pseudo-property [Armstrong] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 17693 | The necessary/contingent distinction may need to recognise possibilities as real [Armstrong] |
| 17685 | Induction aims at 'all Fs', but abduction aims at hidden or theoretical entities [Armstrong] |
| 17683 | Science suggests that the predicate 'grue' is not a genuine single universal [Armstrong] |
| 17675 | Unlike 'green', the 'grue' predicate involves a time and a change [Armstrong] |
| 17674 | The raven paradox has three disjuncts, confirmed by confirming any one of them [Armstrong] |
| 17672 | A good reason for something (the smoke) is not an explanation of it (the fire) [Armstrong] |
| 17684 | To explain observations by a regular law is to explain the observations by the observations [Armstrong] |
| 17676 | Best explanations explain the most by means of the least [Armstrong] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 17664 | Each subject has an appropriate level of abstraction [Armstrong] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
| 17692 | We can't deduce the phenomena from the One [Armstrong] |
| 17689 | Absences might be effects, but surely not causes? [Armstrong] |
| 17662 | Science depends on laws of nature to study unobserved times and spaces [Armstrong] |
| 17682 | A universe couldn't consist of mere laws [Armstrong] |
| 17690 | Oaken conditional laws, Iron universal laws, and Steel necessary laws [Armstrong, by PG] |
| 17670 | Newton's First Law refers to bodies not acted upon by a force, but there may be no such body [Armstrong] |
| 8582 | Regularities are lawful if a second-order universal unites two first-order universals [Armstrong, by Lewis] |
| 17671 | A naive regularity view says if it never occurs then it is impossible [Armstrong] |
| 17681 | The laws of nature link properties with properties [Armstrong] |
| 16246 | Rather than take necessitation between universals as primitive, just make laws primitive [Maudlin on Armstrong] |
| 9480 | Armstrong has an unclear notion of contingent necessitation, which can't necessitate anything [Bird on Armstrong] |