35 ideas
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 4975 | A thought can be split in many ways, so that different parts appear as subject or predicate [Frege] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 9949 | There is the concept, the object falling under it, and the extension (a set, which is also an object) [Frege, by George/Velleman] |
| 18995 | Frege mistakenly takes existence to be a property of concepts, instead of being about things [Frege, by Yablo] |
| 10317 | It is unclear whether Frege included qualities among his abstract objects [Frege, by Hale] |
| 10535 | Frege's 'objects' are both the referents of proper names, and what predicates are true or false of [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 9839 | Frege equated the concepts under which an object falls with its properties [Frege, by Dummett] |
| 4973 | As I understand it, a concept is the meaning of a grammatical predicate [Frege] |
| 9167 | Frege felt that meanings must be public, so they are abstractions rather than mental entities [Frege, by Putnam] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
| 4974 | For all the multiplicity of languages, mankind has a common stock of thoughts [Frege] |
| 7276 | All art is quite useless [Wilde] |
| 7274 | Books are only well or badly written, not moral or immoral [Wilde] |
| 7275 | Having ethical sympathies is a bad mannerism of style in an artist [Wilde] |