20 ideas
15118 | A successful Aristotelian 'definition' is what sciences produces after an investigation [Koslicki] |
15116 | Essences cause necessary features, and definitions describe those necessary features [Koslicki] |
10688 | 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall] |
10304 | Very few things in set theory remain valid in intuitionist mathematics [Bernays] |
10690 | Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall] |
10691 | Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall] |
10695 | Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall] |
10689 | A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall] |
10696 | A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall] |
10693 | Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall] |
10692 | Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall] |
10303 | Restricted Platonism is just an ideal projection of a domain of thought [Bernays] |
10306 | Mathematical abstraction just goes in a different direction from logic [Bernays] |
15110 | An essence and what merely follow from it are distinct [Koslicki] |
15113 | Individuals are perceived, but demonstration and definition require universals [Koslicki] |
15112 | If an object exists, then its essential properties are necessary [Koslicki] |
15111 | In demonstration, the explanatory order must mirror the causal order of the phenomena [Koslicki] |
15115 | In a demonstration the middle term explains, by being part of the definition [Koslicki] |
15117 | Greek uses the same word for 'cause' and 'explanation' [Koslicki] |
15114 | Discovering the Aristotelian essence of thunder will tell us why thunder occurs [Koslicki] |