86 ideas
24146 | All the major problems were formulated before Socrates [Nietzsche] |
24142 | What matters is how humans can be developed [Nietzsche] |
24143 | Thinkers might agree some provisional truths, as methodological assumptions [Nietzsche] |
24125 | Aristotle enjoyed the sham generalities of a system, as the peak of happiness! [Nietzsche] |
22611 | Metaphysics can criticise interpretations of science theories, and give good feedback [Ingthorsson] |
24147 | Thoughts are uncertain, and are just occasions for interpretation [Nietzsche] |
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
22609 | Philosophers accepted first-order logic, because they took science to be descriptive, not explanatory [Ingthorsson] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
24137 | Mathematics is just accurate inferences from definitions, and doesn't involve objects [Nietzsche] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
24131 | There is no 'being'; it is just the opposition to nothingness [Nietzsche] |
22629 | Basic processes are said to be either physical, or organic, or psychological [Ingthorsson] |
22633 | Indirect realists are cautious about the manifest image, and prefer the scientific image [Ingthorsson] |
24151 | I only want thinking that is anchored in body, senses and earth [Nietzsche] |
22606 | Neo-Humeans say there are no substantial connections between anything [Ingthorsson] |
22631 | Properties are said to be categorical qualities or non-qualitative dispositions [Ingthorsson] |
22632 | Physics understands the charge of an electron as a power, not as a quality [Ingthorsson] |
22627 | Compound objects are processes, insofar as change is essential to them [Ingthorsson] |
22613 | Most materialist views postulate smallest indivisible components which are permanent [Ingthorsson] |
22612 | Endurance and perdurance just show the consequences of A or B series time [Ingthorsson] |
22625 | Science suggests causal aspects of the constitution and persistance of objects [Ingthorsson] |
22620 | If causation involves production, that needs persisting objects [Ingthorsson] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
22636 | Every philosophical theory must be true in some possible world, so the ontology is hopeless [Ingthorsson] |
22638 | Worlds may differ in various respects, but no overall similarity of worlds is implied [Ingthorsson] |
24150 | We can only understand through concepts, which subsume particulars in generalities [Nietzsche] |
24138 | Strongly believed a priori is not certain; it may just be a feature of our existence [Nietzsche] |
24130 | An affirmative belief is present in every basic sense impression [Nietzsche] |
24124 | We now have innumerable perspectives to draw on [Nietzsche] |
24145 | Mind is a mechanism of abstraction and simplification, aimed at control [Nietzsche] |
24144 | A cognitive mechanism wanting to know itself is absurd! [Nietzsche] |
24139 | A 'person' is just one possible abstraction from a bundle of qualities [Nietzsche] |
24133 | I have perfected fatalism, as recurrence and denial of the will [Nietzsche] |
24152 | Fate is inspiring, if you understand you are part of it [Nietzsche] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
24129 | We start with images, then words, and then concepts, to which emotions attach [Nietzsche] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
24127 | Judging actions by intentions - like judging painters by their thoughts! [Nietzsche] |
24149 | Values need a perspective, of preserving some aspect of life [Nietzsche] |
24148 | If you love something, it is connected with everything, so all must be affirmed as good [Nietzsche] |
24135 | Egoism should not assume that all egos are equal [Nietzsche] |
24132 | After Socrates virtue is misunderstood, as good for all, not for individuals [Nietzsche] |
24126 | We contain multitudes of characters, which can brought into the open [Nietzsche] |
24136 | Who can endure the thought of eternal recurrence? [Nietzsche] |
24154 | If you want one experience repeated, you must want all of them [Nietzsche] |
24153 | Humans are determined by community, so its preservation is their most valued drive [Nietzsche] |
24134 | There is always slavery, whether we like it or not [Nietzsche] |
24128 | After history following God, or a people, or an idea, we now see it in terms of animals [Nietzsche] |
22605 | Humeans describe the surface of causation, while powers accounts aim at deeper explanations [Ingthorsson] |
22607 | Time and space are not causal, but they determine natural phenomena [Ingthorsson] |
22608 | Casuation is the transmission of conserved quantities between causal processes [Ingthorsson] |
22621 | Causation as transfer only works for asymmetric interactions [Ingthorsson] |
22614 | Interventionist causal theory says it gets a reliable result whenever you manipulate it [Ingthorsson] |
24140 | Cause and effect is a hypothesis, based on our supposed willing of actions [Nietzsche] |
22639 | Causal events are always reciprocal, and there is no distinction of action and reaction [Ingthorsson] |
22615 | One effect cannot act on a second effect in causation, because the second doesn't yet exist [Ingthorsson] |
22616 | Empiricists preferred events to objects as the relata, because they have observable motions [Ingthorsson] |
22617 | Science now says all actions are reciprocal, not unidirectional [Ingthorsson] |
22619 | Causes are not agents; the whole interaction is the cause, and the changed compound is the effect [Ingthorsson] |
22635 | People only accept the counterfactual when they know the underlying cause [Ingthorsson] |
22634 | Counterfactuals don't explain causation, but causation can explain counterfactuals [Ingthorsson] |
22637 | Counterfactual theories are false in possible worlds where causation is actual [Ingthorsson] |
22624 | A cause can fail to produce its normal effect, by prevention, pre-emption, finks or antidotes [Ingthorsson] |
22622 | Any process can go backwards or forwards in time without violating the basic laws of physics [Ingthorsson] |
22618 | In modern physics the first and second laws of motion (unlike the third) fail at extremes [Ingthorsson] |
22630 | If particles have decay rates, they can't really be elementary, in the sense of indivisible [Ingthorsson] |
24141 | Having a sense of time presupposes absolute time [Nietzsche] |
22610 | It is difficult to handle presentism in first-order logic [Ingthorsson] |