40 ideas
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
| 2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
| 21059 | General rules of action also need a judgement about when to apply them [Kant] |
| 21061 | Duty does not aim at an end, but gives rise to universal happiness as aim of the will [Kant] |
| 21060 | It can't be a duty to strive after the impossible [Kant] |
| 21062 | The will's motive is the absolute law itself, and moral feeling is receptivity to law [Kant] |
| 21071 | There can be no restraints on freedom if reason does not reveal some basic rights [Kant] |
| 21063 | Personal contracts are for some end, but a civil state contract involves a duty to share [Kant] |
| 21068 | There must be a unanimous contract that citizens accept majority decisions [Kant] |
| 21069 | A contract is theoretical, but it can guide rulers to make laws which the whole people will accept [Kant] |
| 21070 | A law is unjust if the whole people could not possibly agree to it [Kant] |
| 21067 | A citizen must control his own life, and possess property or an important skill [Kant] |
| 21064 | A lawful civil state must embody freedom, equality and independence for its members [Kant] |
| 21066 | Citizens can rise to any rank that talent, effort and luck can achieve [Kant] |
| 21065 | You can't make a contract renouncing your right to make contracts! [Kant] |
| 21072 | The people (who have to fight) and not the head of state should declare a war [Kant] |