65 ideas
| 3600 | Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes] |
| 3601 | Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes] |
| 3602 | Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes] |
| 2956 | There is nothing so obvious that a philosopher cannot be found to deny it [Lockwood] |
| 2963 | There may only be necessary and sufficient conditions (and counterfactuals) because we intervene in the world [Lockwood] |
| 2958 | No one has ever succeeded in producing an acceptable non-trivial analysis of anything [Lockwood] |
| 3603 | Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG] |
| 3612 | Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes] |
| 13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
| 3610 | Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes] |
| 13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
| 2959 | If something is described in two different ways, is that two facts, or one fact presented in two ways? [Lockwood] |
| 13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
| 13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
| 13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
| 13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
| 13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
| 13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
| 13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
| 13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
| 13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
| 13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
| 13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
| 13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
| 13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
| 13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
| 13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
| 2969 | How does a direct realist distinguish a building from Buckingham Palace? [Lockwood] |
| 13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
| 3605 | We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes] |
| 2970 | Dogs seem to have beliefs, and beliefs require concepts [Lockwood] |
| 1583 | In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 3607 | In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes] |
| 3617 | I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes] |
| 3611 | Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes] |
| 2961 | Empiricism is a theory of meaning as well as of knowledge [Lockwood] |
| 2960 | Commonsense realism must account for the similarity of genuine perceptions and known illusions [Lockwood] |
| 3606 | I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes] |
| 3604 | When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes] |
| 3618 | Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes] |
| 3615 | Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes] |
| 2952 | A 1988 estimate gave the brain 3 x 10-to-the-14 synaptic junctions [Lockwood] |
| 2964 | How come unconscious states also cause behaviour? [Lockwood] |
| 2951 | Could there be unconscious beliefs and desires? [Lockwood] |
| 2953 | Fish may operate by blindsight [Lockwood] |
| 3609 | I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes] |
| 2967 | We might even learn some fundamental physics from introspection [Lockwood] |
| 3608 | I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes] |
| 3613 | Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes] |
| 3616 | The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes] |
| 2966 | Can phenomenal qualities exist unsensed? [Lockwood] |
| 2955 | If mental events occur in time, then relativity says they are in space [Lockwood] |
| 2950 | Only logical positivists ever believed behaviourism [Lockwood] |
| 2954 | Identity theory likes the identity of lightning and electrical discharges [Lockwood] |
| 13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
| 3614 | A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes] |
| 2971 | Perhaps logical positivism showed that there is no dividing line between science and metaphysics [Lockwood] |
| 13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
| 13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
| 1581 | Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes] |
| 2962 | Maybe causation is a form of rational explanation, not an observation or a state of mind [Lockwood] |
| 16686 | God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes] |
| 2949 | We have the confused idea that time is a process of change [Lockwood] |