66 ideas
12926 | Wisdom is the science of happiness [Leibniz] |
12903 | Wise people have fewer acts of will, because such acts are linked together [Leibniz] |
12914 | Metaphysics is geometrical, resting on non-contradiction and sufficient reason [Leibniz] |
16252 | Metaphysics uses empty words, or just produces pseudo-statements [Carnap] |
12915 | Definitions can only be real if the item is possible [Leibniz] |
12910 | The predicate is in the subject of a true proposition [Leibniz] |
19333 | A truth is just a proposition in which the predicate is contained within the subject [Leibniz] |
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
12920 | There is no multiplicity without true units [Leibniz] |
12319 | What is not truly one being is not truly a being either [Leibniz] |
12922 | A thing 'expresses' another if they have a constant and fixed relationship [Leibniz] |
13079 | A substance contains the laws of its operations, and its actions come from its own depth [Leibniz] |
12745 | Philosophy needs the precision of the unity given by substances [Leibniz] |
12921 | Accidental unity has degrees, from a mob to a society to a machine or organism [Leibniz] |
12746 | We find unity in reason, and unity in perception, but these are not true unity [Leibniz] |
12916 | A body is a unified aggregate, unless it has an indivisible substance [Leibniz] |
12919 | Unity needs an indestructible substance, to contain everything which will happen to it [Leibniz] |
12923 | Every bodily substance must have a soul, or something analogous to a soul [Leibniz] |
12704 | Aggregates don’t reduce to points, or atoms, or illusion, so must reduce to substance [Leibniz] |
13077 | Basic predicates give the complete concept, which then predicts all of the actions [Leibniz] |
12908 | Essences exist in the divine understanding [Leibniz] |
12706 | Bodies need a soul (or something like it) to avoid being mere phenomena [Leibniz] |
12906 | Truths about species are eternal or necessary, but individual truths concern what exists [Leibniz] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
12904 | If varieties of myself can be conceived of as distinct from me, then they are not me [Leibniz] |
11981 | If someone's life went differently, then that would be another individual [Leibniz] |
12905 | I cannot think my non-existence, nor exist without being myself [Leibniz] |
19334 | I can't just know myself to be a substance; I must distinguish myself from others, which is hard [Leibniz] |
5033 | Nothing should be taken as certain without foundations [Leibniz] |
12913 | Nature is explained by mathematics and mechanism, but the laws rest on metaphysics [Leibniz] |
13089 | To fully conceive the subject is to explain the resulting predicates and events [Leibniz] |
5034 | Mind is a thinking substance which can know God and eternal truths [Leibniz] |
5032 | It seems probable that animals have souls, but not consciousness [Leibniz] |
5031 | Everything which happens is not necessary, but is certain after God chooses this universe [Leibniz] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
12911 | Concepts are what unite a proposition [Leibniz] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
12925 | Beauty increases with familiarity [Leibniz] |
12927 | Happiness is advancement towards perfection [Leibniz] |
15955 | I think the corpuscular theory, rather than forms or qualities, best explains particular phenomena [Leibniz] |
12907 | Each possible world contains its own laws, reflected in the possible individuals of that world [Leibniz] |
12924 | Motion alone is relative, but force is real, and establishes its subject [Leibniz] |
12909 | Everything, even miracles, belongs to order [Leibniz] |
5030 | Miracles are extraordinary operations by God, but are nevertheless part of his design [Leibniz] |
12912 | Immortality without memory is useless [Leibniz] |
12917 | The soul is indestructible and always self-aware [Leibniz] |
12918 | Animals have souls, but lack consciousness [Leibniz] |