Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Pluralism', 'Empty Names' and 'Mind and World'

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33 ideas

2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 3. Pure Reason
The logical space of reasons is a natural phenomenon, and it is the realm of freedom [McDowell]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 1. Truth
Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 2. Intuitionist Logic
(∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 5. Relevant Logic
Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall]
Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall]
A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall]
Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall]
It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall]
4. Formal Logic / E. Nonclassical Logics / 6. Free Logic
Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall]
Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 8. Logic of Mathematics
The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Semantic theory should specify when an act of naming is successful [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / c. Names as referential
Millians say a name just means its object [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / e. Empty names
Sentences with empty names can be understood, be co-referential, and even be true [Sawyer]
Frege's compositional account of truth-vaues makes 'Pegasus doesn't exist' neither true nor false [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
Definites descriptions don't solve the empty names problem, because the properties may not exist [Sawyer]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 6. Paradoxes in Language / d. The Preface paradox
Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
Representation must be propositional if it can give reasons and be epistemological [McDowell, by Burge]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
There is no pure Given, but it is cultured, rather than entirely relative [McDowell, by Macbeth]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
Sense impressions already have conceptual content [McDowell]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 6. Judgement / a. Nature of Judgement
Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 8. Possible Worlds Semantics
We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 1. Propositions
Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall]
19. Language / F. Communication / 4. Private Language
Forming concepts by abstraction from the Given is private definition, which the Private Lang. Arg. attacks [McDowell]