Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Logical Consequence', 'Significance of the Kripkean Nec A Posteriori' and 'Value Theory'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

28 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 5. Modern Philosophy / c. Modern philosophy mid-period
13966 Analytic philosophy loved the necessary a priori analytic, linguistic modality, and rigour [Soames]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
13974 If philosophy is analysis of meaning, available to all competent speakers, what's left for philosophers? [Soames]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
10688 'Equivocation' is when terms do not mean the same thing in premises and conclusion [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 4. Pure Logic
10690 Formal logic is invariant under permutations, or devoid of content, or gives the norms for thought [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 2. Types of Consequence
10691 Logical consequence needs either proofs, or absence of counterexamples [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 4. Semantic Consequence |=
10695 Logical consequence is either necessary truth preservation, or preservation based on interpretation [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 8. Material Implication
10689 A step is a 'material consequence' if we need contents as well as form [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
10696 A 'logical truth' (or 'tautology', or 'theorem') follows from empty premises [Beall/Restall]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
10693 Models are mathematical structures which interpret the non-logical primitives [Beall/Restall]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 2. Proof in Mathematics
10692 Hilbert proofs have simple rules and complex axioms, and natural deduction is the opposite [Beall/Restall]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
18680 To avoid misunderstandings supervenience is often expressed negatively: no A-change without B-change [Orsi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 7. Essence and Necessity / a. Essence as necessary properties
13969 Kripkean essential properties and relations are necessary, in all genuinely possible worlds [Soames]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 3. Necessity by Convention
13973 A key achievement of Kripke is showing that important modalities are not linguistic in source [Soames]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds
13968 Kripkean possible worlds are abstract maximal states in which the real world could have been [Soames]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 10. Two-Dimensional Semantics
13972 Two-dimensionalism reinstates descriptivism, and reconnects necessity and apriority to analyticity [Soames]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
18684 Rather than requiring an action, a reason may 'entice' us, or be 'eligible', or 'justify' it [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
18666 Value-maker concepts (such as courageous or elegant) simultaneously describe and evaluate [Orsi]
18667 The '-able' concepts (like enviable) say this thing deserves a particular response [Orsi]
18685 Final value is favoured for its own sake, and personal value for someone's sake [Orsi]
18679 Things are only valuable if something makes it valuable, and we can ask for the reason [Orsi]
18682 A complex value is not just the sum of the values of the parts [Orsi]
18683 Trichotomy Thesis: comparable values must be better, worse or the same [Orsi]
18686 The Fitting Attitude view says values are fitting or reasonable, and values are just byproducts [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / c. Objective value
18672 Values from reasons has the 'wrong kind of reason' problem - admiration arising from fear [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
18677 A thing may have final value, which is still derived from other values, or from relations [Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / a. Normativity
18668 Truths about value entail normative truths about actions or attitudes [Orsi]
18670 The Buck-Passing view of normative values says other properties are reasons for the value [Orsi]
18669 Values can be normative in the Fitting Attitude account, where 'good' means fitting favouring [Orsi]