54 ideas
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
3005 | 'Jocasta' needs to be distinguished from 'Oedipus's mother' because they are connected by different properties [Fodor] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
7014 | A particle and a coin heads-or-tails pick out to perfectly well-defined predicates and properties [Fodor] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
3008 | Evolution suggests that innate knowledge of human psychology would be beneficial [Fodor] |
3009 | Sticklebacks have an innate idea that red things are rivals [Fodor] |
2990 | Contrary to commonsense, most of what is in the mind seems to be unlearned [Fodor] |
2994 | In CRTT thought may be represented, content must be [Fodor] |
7326 | Intentionality doesn't go deep enough to appear on the physicists' ultimate list of things [Fodor] |
15494 | We can't use propositions to explain intentional attitudes, because they would need explaining [Fodor] |
3001 | Behaviourism has no theory of mental causation [Fodor] |
2993 | Any piece of software can always be hard-wired [Fodor] |
3011 | Causal powers must be a crucial feature of mental states [Fodor] |
5498 | Mind is a set of hierarchical 'homunculi', which are made up in turn from subcomponents [Fodor, by Lycan] |
2995 | Supervenience gives good support for mental causation [Fodor] |
2991 | Hume's associationism offers no explanation at all of rational thought [Fodor] |
3002 | If mind is just physical, how can it follow the rules required for intelligent thought? [Fodor] |
2992 | We may be able to explain rationality mechanically [Fodor] |
2988 | Folk psychology is the only explanation of behaviour we have [Fodor] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
3010 | Belief and desire are structured states, which need mentalese [Fodor] |
2999 | Obsession with narrow content leads to various sorts of hopeless anti-realism [Fodor] |
3012 | Do identical thoughts have identical causal roles? [Fodor] |
2998 | Grice thinks meaning is inherited from the propositional attitudes which sentences express [Fodor] |
3006 | Whatever in the mind delivers falsehood is parasitic on what delivers truth [Fodor] |
3007 | Many different verification procedures can reach 'star', but it only has one semantic value [Fodor] |
3004 | The meaning of a sentence derives from its use in expressing an attitude [Fodor] |
3000 | Meaning holism is a crazy doctrine [Fodor] |
3003 | Very different mental states can share their contents, so content doesn't seem to be constructed from functional role [Fodor] |
2996 | Mental states may have the same content but different extensions [Fodor] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
13554 | True greatness is never allowing events to disturb you [Seneca] |
13556 | Every night I critically review how I have behaved during the day [Seneca] |
13552 | Anger is an extreme vice, threatening sanity, and gripping whole states [Seneca] |
13553 | Anger is a vice which afflicts good men as well as bad [Seneca] |